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Found 6 Skills
Sonatype integration. Manage data, records, and automate workflows. Use when the user wants to interact with Sonatype data.
External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.
Detect, respond to, and prevent software supply chain attacks on package registries, container images, and CI/CD pipelines with lockfile auditing, provenance verification, and emergency response playbooks.
Use for software supply-chain security assessment covering SBOM, SCA, CI/CD pipelines, container images, build integrity, dependency provenance, and vulnerability reachability.
Comprehensive offensive methodology for software supply chain attacks covering the full kill chain from reconnaissance through exploitation. Addresses dependency confusion across npm, PyPI, and NuGet ecosystems where internal registry override allows an attacker to inject malicious packages that shadow private dependencies. Covers typosquatting techniques for popular packages, compromised package injection via maintainer account takeover or social engineering, and build system attacks through Makefile injection, setup.py install hooks, and npm postinstall scripts. Extends into CI/CD artifact tampering where build outputs are replaced or modified in transit, code signing abuse through stolen or self-signed certificates, upstream repository compromise via commit injection or force-push to trusted repos, and container image supply chain attacks including base image trojaning and registry confusion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) and T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain). Integrates tooling such as confused for dependency confusion scanning and dependency-check for known vulnerable component detection. Each technique section provides reproducible proof-of-concept patterns, detection guidance for defenders, and engagement-safe execution notes for authorized red team operations.
Software supply-chain security assessment aligned with SLSA covering deterministic lockfiles, `ignore-scripts` package policies, Sigstore/Cosign artifact signing, CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM generation, and transitive CVE reachability.