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Use when reviewing code for security vulnerabilities, implementing authentication/authorization, handling user input, or discussing web application security. Covers OWASP Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, and Agentic AI security (2026).
npx skill4agent add agamm/claude-code-owasp owasp-security| # | Vulnerability | Key Prevention |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features |
| A03 | Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls |
| A07 | Auth Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting |
| A10 | Exception Handling | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
# UNSAFE
cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}")
# SAFE
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))# UNSAFE
os.system(f"convert {filename} output.png")
# SAFE
subprocess.run(["convert", filename, "output.png"], shell=False)# UNSAFE
hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
# SAFE
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
PasswordHasher().hash(password)# UNSAFE - No authorization check
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
return db.get_user(user_id)
# SAFE - Authorization enforced
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
@login_required
def get_user(user_id):
if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
abort(403)
return db.get_user(user_id)# UNSAFE - Exposes internals
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
return str(e), 500
# SAFE - Fail-closed, log context
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
error_id = uuid.uuid4()
logger.exception(f"Error {error_id}: {e}")
return {"error": "An error occurred", "id": str(error_id)}, 500# UNSAFE - Fail-open
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return auth_service.check(user, resource)
except Exception:
return True # DANGEROUS!
# SAFE - Fail-closed
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return auth_service.check(user, resource)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Auth check failed: {e}")
return False # Deny on error| Risk | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| ASI01: Goal Hijack | Prompt injection alters agent objectives | Input sanitization, goal boundaries, behavioral monitoring |
| ASI02: Tool Misuse | Tools used in unintended ways | Least privilege, fine-grained permissions, validate I/O |
| ASI03: Privilege Abuse | Credential escalation across agents | Short-lived scoped tokens, identity verification |
| ASI04: Supply Chain | Compromised plugins/MCP servers | Verify signatures, sandbox, allowlist plugins |
| ASI05: Code Execution | Unsafe code generation/execution | Sandbox execution, static analysis, human approval |
| ASI06: Memory Poisoning | Corrupted RAG/context data | Validate stored content, segment by trust level |
| ASI07: Agent Comms | Spoofing between agents | Authenticate, encrypt, verify message integrity |
| ASI08: Cascading Failures | Errors propagate across systems | Circuit breakers, graceful degradation, isolation |
| ASI09: Trust Exploitation | Social engineering via AI | Label AI content, user education, verification steps |
| ASI10: Rogue Agents | Compromised agents acting maliciously | Behavior monitoring, kill switches, anomaly detection |
Important: The examples below are illustrative starting points, not exhaustive. When reviewing code, think like a senior security researcher: consider the language's memory model, type system, standard library pitfalls, ecosystem-specific attack vectors, and historical CVE patterns. Each language has deeper quirks beyond what's listed here.
// UNSAFE: Prototype pollution
Object.assign(target, userInput)
// SAFE: Use null prototype or validate keys
Object.assign(Object.create(null), validated)
// UNSAFE: eval injection
eval(userCode)
// SAFE: Never use eval with user inputeval()innerHTMLdocument.write()__proto__# UNSAFE: Pickle RCE
pickle.loads(user_data)
# SAFE: Use JSON or validate source
json.loads(user_data)
# UNSAFE: Format string injection
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'" % user_input
# SAFE: Parameterized
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (user_input,))pickleeval()exec()os.system()subprocessshell=True// UNSAFE: Arbitrary deserialization
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(userStream);
Object obj = ois.readObject();
// SAFE: Use allowlist or JSON
ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
mapper.readValue(json, SafeClass.class);ObjectInputStreamRuntime.exec()// UNSAFE: BinaryFormatter RCE
BinaryFormatter bf = new BinaryFormatter();
object obj = bf.Deserialize(stream);
// SAFE: Use System.Text.Json
var obj = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<SafeType>(json);BinaryFormatterJavaScriptSerializerTypeNameHandling.All// UNSAFE: Type juggling in auth
if ($password == $stored_hash) { ... }
// SAFE: Use strict comparison
if (hash_equals($stored_hash, $password)) { ... }
// UNSAFE: File inclusion
include($_GET['page'] . '.php');
// SAFE: Allowlist pages
$allowed = ['home', 'about']; include(in_array($page, $allowed) ? "$page.php" : 'home.php');=====include/requireunserialize()preg_replace/eextract()// UNSAFE: Race condition
go func() { counter++ }()
// SAFE: Use sync primitives
atomic.AddInt64(&counter, 1)
// UNSAFE: Template injection
template.HTML(userInput)
// SAFE: Let template escape
{{.UserInput}}template.HTML()unsafe# UNSAFE: Mass assignment
User.new(params[:user])
# SAFE: Strong parameters
User.new(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email))
# UNSAFE: YAML RCE
YAML.load(user_input)
# SAFE: Use safe_load
YAML.safe_load(user_input)// CAUTION: Unsafe bypasses safety
unsafe { ptr::read(user_ptr) }
// CAUTION: Release integer overflow
let x: u8 = 255;
let y = x + 1; // Wraps to 0 in release!
// SAFE: Use checked arithmetic
let y = x.checked_add(1).unwrap_or(255);unsafe.unwrap()// UNSAFE: Force unwrap on untrusted data
let value = jsonDict["key"]!
// SAFE: Safe unwrapping
guard let value = jsonDict["key"] else { return }
// UNSAFE: Format string
String(format: userInput, args)
// SAFE: Don't use user input as format// UNSAFE: Platform type from Java
val len = javaString.length // NPE if null
// SAFE: Explicit null check
val len = javaString?.length ?: 0
// UNSAFE: Reflection
clazz.getDeclaredMethod(userInput)
// SAFE: Allowlist methods// UNSAFE: Buffer overflow
char buf[10]; strcpy(buf, userInput);
// SAFE: Bounds checking
strncpy(buf, userInput, sizeof(buf) - 1);
// UNSAFE: Format string
printf(userInput);
// SAFE: Always use format specifier
printf("%s", userInput);strcpysprintfgets// UNSAFE: XXE
val xml = XML.loadString(userInput)
// SAFE: Disable external entities
val factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance()
factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false)Serializable# UNSAFE: eval injection
eval(parse(text = user_input))
# SAFE: Never parse user input as code
# UNSAFE: Path traversal
read.csv(paste0("data/", user_file))
# SAFE: Validate filename
if (grepl("^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\\.csv$", user_file)) read.csv(...)eval()parse()source()system()# UNSAFE: Regex DoS
$input =~ /$user_pattern/;
# SAFE: Use quotemeta
$input =~ /\Q$user_pattern\E/;
# UNSAFE: open() command injection
open(FILE, $user_file);
# SAFE: Three-argument open
open(my $fh, '<', $user_file);open()eval# UNSAFE: Unquoted variables
rm $user_file
# SAFE: Always quote
rm "$user_file"
# UNSAFE: eval
eval "$user_command"
# SAFE: Never eval user inputeval$(...)set -euo pipefail-- UNSAFE: Code injection
loadstring(user_code)()
-- SAFE: Use sandboxed environment with restricted functionsloadstringloadfiledofileos.executeio# UNSAFE: Atom exhaustion DoS
String.to_atom(user_input)
# SAFE: Use existing atoms only
String.to_existing_atom(user_input)
# UNSAFE: Code injection
Code.eval_string(user_input)
# SAFE: Never eval user inputString.to_atomCode.eval_string:erlang.binary_to_term// UNSAFE: Storing secrets in SharedPreferences
prefs.setString('auth_token', token);
// SAFE: Use flutter_secure_storage
secureStorage.write(key: 'auth_token', value: token);dart:mirrorsFunction.apply# UNSAFE: Injection
Invoke-Expression $userInput
# SAFE: Avoid Invoke-Expression with user data
# UNSAFE: Unvalidated path
Get-Content $userPath
# SAFE: Validate path is within allowed directoryInvoke-Expression& $userVarStart-Process-ExecutionPolicy Bypass-- UNSAFE: String concatenation
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId
-- SAFE: Parameterized query (language-specific)
-- Use prepared statements in ALL casesEXECUTE IMMEDIATE