metaphysics-ontology

Compare original and translation side by side

🇺🇸

Original

English

🇨🇳

Translation

Chinese

Metaphysics & Ontology Skill

形而上学与本体论 Skill

Master the fundamental questions of metaphysics: What exists? What is being? What is the ultimate nature of reality?

精通形而上学的核心问题：什么存在？何为实存？实在的终极本质是什么？

Core Questions

核心问题

Fundamental Issues

基础议题

Question	Field	Examples
What exists?	Ontology	Numbers? Properties? Possible worlds?
What is being?	Fundamental ontology	Being vs. beings
What are things made of?	Substance metaphysics	Matter, form, properties
What makes something the same over time?	Persistence	Personal identity, ship of Theseus
What is causation?	Causal metaphysics	Regularity, counterfactual, powers
What is possible/necessary?	Modality	Possible worlds, essence

问题	领域	示例
什么存在？	本体论	数字？属性？可能世界？
何为实存？	基础本体论	实存（Being）与存在者（beings）
事物由什么构成？	实体形而上学	质料、形式、属性
是什么让事物在时间中保持同一？	持存性	人格同一性、忒修斯之船
何为因果性？	因果形而上学	规则性、反事实、能力
什么是可能/必然？	模态	可能世界、本质

Ontology: What Exists?

本体论：什么存在？

Ontological Categories

本体论范畴

ONTOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE
═════════════════════

CONCRETE PARTICULARS
├── Physical objects (tables, planets)
├── Mental events (thoughts, pains)
└── Persons

ABSTRACT OBJECTS (?)
├── Numbers, sets
├── Propositions
├── Properties/universals
└── Possible worlds

EVENTS AND PROCESSES
├── The Battle of Waterloo
├── The melting of ice
└── My walking to work

FACTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
├── That snow is white
├── The redness of the apple
└── The table's being square

ONTOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE
═════════════════════

CONCRETE PARTICULARS
├── Physical objects (tables, planets)
├── Mental events (thoughts, pains)
└── Persons

ABSTRACT OBJECTS (?)
├── Numbers, sets
├── Propositions
├── Properties/universals
└── Possible worlds

EVENTS AND PROCESSES
├── The Battle of Waterloo
├── The melting of ice
└── My walking to work

FACTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
├── That snow is white
├── The redness of the apple
└── The table's being square

Platonism vs. Nominalism

柏拉图主义 vs 唯名论

Platonism: Abstract objects exist

Numbers exist independently of minds
Properties are real universals
Mathematical truth is discovery, not invention

Nominalism: Only particulars exist

No abstract objects
"Redness" is just a word for similar things
Mathematical objects are useful fictions

柏拉图主义：抽象对象存在

数字独立于心灵存在
属性是真实的共相
数学真理是发现而非发明

唯名论：只有殊相存在

不存在抽象对象
"红性"只是对相似事物的称呼
数学对象是有用的虚构

Substance and Properties

实体与属性

Substance Theories

实体理论

Aristotelian Substance:

Primary substances: individual things (this horse)
Secondary substances: kinds (horse, animal)
Substances persist through change; accidents don't

Bundle Theory:

No underlying substance
Objects = bundles of properties
Problem: What ties the bundle together?

Substratum Theory:

Bare particulars underlie properties
Problem: What is bare substratum? Unknowable?

亚里士多德式实体：

第一实体：个体事物（这匹马）
第二实体：种类（马、动物）
实体在变化中持存；偶性则不

束理论：

没有底层实体
对象=属性的束
问题：是什么将束绑定在一起？

基质理论：

赤裸殊相是属性的基础
问题：赤裸殊相是什么？不可知吗？

Properties

属性

Universals vs. Tropes:

Universals	Tropes
One property, many instances	Each instance a particular
"Redness" is one thing	This red ≠ that red
Shared by objects	Resembling particulars
Explains resemblance	Avoids mysterious sharing

共相 vs 特普：

共相	特普
一个属性，多个实例	每个实例都是殊相
"红性"是单一事物	这个红≠那个红
为对象所共享	相似的殊相
解释相似性	避免神秘的共享

Identity and Persistence

同一性与持存性

Personal Identity

人格同一性

Theories:

PERSONAL IDENTITY THEORIES
══════════════════════════

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
├── Memory, personality, beliefs
├── Locke: consciousness makes identity
├── Parfit: What matters isn't identity
└── Problems: Fission, amnesia

BIOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
├── Same organism = same person
├── Animalism (Olson)
└── Problems: Transplant cases

SOUL/SUBSTANCE VIEW
├── Immaterial soul persists
├── Problems: Interaction, detection
└── Forensic vs. metaphysical identity

理论：

PERSONAL IDENTITY THEORIES
══════════════════════════

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
├── Memory, personality, beliefs
├── Locke: consciousness makes identity
├── Parfit: What matters isn't identity
└── Problems: Fission, amnesia

BIOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
├── Same organism = same person
├── Animalism (Olson)
└── Problems: Transplant cases

SOUL/SUBSTANCE VIEW
├── Immaterial soul persists
├── Problems: Interaction, detection
└── Forensic vs. metaphysical identity

Ship of Theseus

忒修斯之船

SHIP OF THESEUS
═══════════════

Original ship's planks gradually replaced.
Is it still the same ship?

VARIANT: Old planks reassembled into second ship.
Which is the original?

POSITIONS:
├── Neither (no real identity)
├── Repaired ship (spatial continuity)
├── Reassembled ship (material continuity)
└── Both partially (graded identity)

SHIP OF THESEUS
═══════════════

Original ship's planks gradually replaced.
Is it still the same ship?

VARIANT: Old planks reassembled into second ship.
Which is the original?

POSITIONS:
├── Neither (no real identity)
├── Repaired ship (spatial continuity)
├── Reassembled ship (material continuity)
└── Both partially (graded identity)

Causation

因果性

Theories

理论

Regularity Theory (Hume):

Causation = constant conjunction
No necessary connection
"Cement of the universe" is just habit

Counterfactual Theory (Lewis):

C causes E iff: If C hadn't occurred, E wouldn't have
Analyzed via possible worlds

Powers/Dispositions:

Causes have intrinsic causal powers
Salt's solubility is real property
Not reducible to regularities

Process/Mechanism:

Causation = physical process
Transfer of energy, momentum
Tracing causal history

规则性理论（休谟）：

因果性=恒常联结
没有必然联系
"宇宙之黏合剂"只是习惯

反事实理论（刘易斯）：

C导致E当且仅当：如果C未发生，E就不会发生
通过可能世界分析

能力/倾向：

原因具有内在的因果能力
盐的溶解性是真实属性
不可还原为规则性

过程/机制：

因果性=物理过程
能量、动量的传递
追溯因果历史

Modality

模态

Possible Worlds

可能世界

Modal Claims:

Necessarily P: P is true in all possible worlds
Possibly P: P is true in some possible world
Contingently P: P is true but could be false

What Are Possible Worlds?:

POSSIBLE WORLDS REALISM
═══════════════════════

MODAL REALISM (Lewis)
├── Possible worlds are concrete realities
├── As real as actual world
├── "Actual" is indexical (like "here")
└── Controversial but powerful

ERSATZISM
├── Possible worlds are abstract objects
├── Sets of propositions, or
├── Maximal states of affairs
└── More conservative

FICTIONALISM
├── Possible worlds are useful fictions
├── No commitment to existence
└── Instrumentalist reading

模态主张：

必然P：P在所有可能世界中为真
可能P：P在某些可能世界中为真
偶然P：P为真但可能为假

可能世界是什么？：

POSSIBLE WORLDS REALISM
═══════════════════════

MODAL REALISM (Lewis)
├── Possible worlds are concrete realities
├── As real as actual world
├── "Actual" is indexical (like "here")
└── Controversial but powerful

ERSATZISM
├── Possible worlds are abstract objects
├── Sets of propositions, or
├── Maximal states of affairs
└── More conservative

FICTIONALISM
├── Possible worlds are useful fictions
├── No commitment to existence
└── Instrumentalist reading

Essence and Necessity

本质与必然性

Essential Properties: Properties a thing must have to be that thing Accidental Properties: Properties a thing happens to have

Kripkean Essentialism:

Origin is essential (you couldn't have different parents)
Natural kinds have essences (water = H₂O necessarily)
Names are rigid designators

本质属性：事物要成为该事物必须具有的属性偶性：事物碰巧具有的属性

克里普克式本质主义：

起源是本质的（你不可能有不同的父母）
自然种类具有本质（水必然是H₂O）
名称是严格指示词

Time

时间

Theories of Time

时间理论

A-Theory (Tensed):

Past, present, future are real
Present is metaphysically special
Time flows

B-Theory (Tenseless):

Only earlier-than, simultaneous, later-than relations
No privileged present
"Block universe" — all times equally real

A-理论（带时态）：

过去、现在、未来都是真实的
现在在形而上学上是特殊的
时间流动

B-理论（无时态）：

只有早于、同时、晚于的关系
没有特权的现在
"块宇宙"——所有时间同等真实

Persistence Through Time

跨时间持存

Endurantism: Objects are wholly present at each moment Perdurantism: Objects have temporal parts (stages)

PERSISTENCE VIEWS
═════════════════

ENDURANTISM               PERDURANTISM
├── Object wholly         ├── Object has temporal parts
│   present at each time  │   (like spatial parts)
├── Properties change     ├── Different stages have
│   (intrinsic change)    │   different properties
└── Intuitive but         └── Handles change better but
    faces puzzles             counterintuitive

持续论：对象在每个时刻都是完全在场的 分存论：对象具有时间部分（阶段）

PERSISTENCE VIEWS
═════════════════

ENDURANTISM               PERDURANTISM
├── Object wholly         ├── Object has temporal parts
│   present at each time  │   (like spatial parts)
├── Properties change     ├── Different stages have
│   (intrinsic change)    │   different properties
└── Intuitive but         └── Handles change better but
    faces puzzles             counterintuitive

Composition

组合

The Special Composition Question

特殊组合问题

When do parts compose a whole?

Universalism: Any objects compose something Nihilism: No composite objects exist Restricted: Some conditions required (contact, life, etc.)

部分何时构成整体？

普遍主义：任何对象都构成某个事物 虚无主义：不存在复合对象 受限主义：需要某些条件（接触、生命等）

Mereology

分体论

Part-whole relations
Proper vs. improper parts
Transitivity of parthood
Supplementation principles

部分-整体关系
真部分与非真部分
部分关系的传递性
补充原则

Key Vocabulary

关键词汇

Term	Meaning
Ontology	Study of what exists
Metaphysics	Study of fundamental nature of reality
Substance	What exists in itself
Property	What is attributed to substance
Universal	One thing shared by many
Particular	Individual, unrepeatable
Trope	Particular instance of property
Modal	Concerning possibility/necessity
A priori	Independent of experience
A posteriori	Dependent on experience
Essence	What makes thing what it is
Accident	What thing contingently has
Supervenience	No A-difference without B-difference
Haecceity	Thisness; individual essence

术语	含义
Ontology	关于存在的研究
Metaphysics	关于实在基础本质的研究
Substance	独立存在的事物
Property	归属于实体的东西
Universal	为多个事物共享的东西
Particular	个体的、不可重复的事物
Trope	属性的具体实例
Modal	关于可能性/必然性的
A priori	独立于经验的
A posteriori	依赖于经验的
Essence	使事物成为该事物的东西
Accident	事物偶然具有的东西
Supervenience	没有B的差异就没有A的差异
Haecceity	此性；个体本质