LOCATOR RESOLUTION (before reading ANY target code or artifact):
0. ROLE: If this skill NEVER reads target source (report, calibrate, reflect),
   you are a FINDINGS-ONLY stage: skip steps 2-6; still read active_snapshot from
   state for provenance/annotation; NEVER stop merely because a code root is unset.
1. Determine CODE_ROOT, in this priority order:
   a. If --target_root is passed on THIS invocation, CODE_ROOT = --target_root.
      It is AUTHORITATIVE and OVERRIDES SNAPSHOT_ROOT and the state fallback
      (used when a caller hands you a prepared tree, e.g. a patched shadow).
   b. Else if --snapshot_root (or SNAPSHOT_ROOT) is passed, use it.
   c. Else read state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json (state_root from
      --state_root if passed, else ./workspace/... relative to the current dir)
      -> active_snapshot.root / .snapshot_id / .snapshot_pinned.
   d. Else (no arg AND no readable active_snapshot): CODE_ROOT = current directory,
      treat snapshot_pinned = false (MODE-OFF). Do NOT stop.
2. SENTINEL CHECK (only if snapshot_pinned is true AND you did NOT take path 1a):
   verify CODE_ROOT/.mantis_snapshot_id exists and equals SNAPSHOT_ID. If missing
   or different -> STOP "snapshot sentinel mismatch". (A --target_root tree (1a) is
   deliberately mutated and is sentinel-EXEMPT.)
3. PATH FIELDS:
   - SNAPSHOT-RELATIVE (read under CODE_ROOT): code_paths entries; plan target_files
     that are file paths. Strip ONLY a trailing ":<digits>". A code_paths entry
     containing "://" is a URL/endpoint, NOT a file read. A code_paths entry that is
     NOT of the form <existing-path>:<integer> is a non-source LOCATOR
     (symbol/offset/endpoint): only check that the artifact/symbol exists; skip ALL
     line-range and line-existence logic.
   - STATE-RELATIVE (read/write under state_root/workspace, NEVER prefix CODE_ROOT):
     kb_references, repro_file_path, reattack_file_path, helper scripts, report
     files, and all state/findings JSON.
4. Never WRITE under CODE_ROOT when snapshot_pinned is true. Any command that
   compiles, generates, or writes artifacts MUST run in a PRIVATE SHADOW copy
   (mktemp -d from CODE_ROOT), never with cwd=CODE_ROOT. Read-only inspection may
   cd into CODE_ROOT.
5. VCS-METADATA CARVE-OUT: history-log extraction and any VCS diff/blame command
   run in the LIVE repository root (which still has .git/.hg/.repo), NOT CODE_ROOT
   (the snapshot copy strips VCS metadata). Do NOT stop merely because CODE_ROOT
   lacks .git/.hg/.repo.
6. Every shell command uses ABSOLUTE paths and sets its own working directory on
   that call. Do NOT assume the working directory persists between calls.

[!NOTE] CURRENT-PASS CHECK (defensive; the binding guarantee is on the harness per

mantis-pipeline-adapter

Scenario 2): if

active_snapshot

is present AND

active_snapshot.pass != state.pass_number

, treat the snapshot as STALE for this pass — STOP "stale active_snapshot: pass mismatch" or degrade as HALT (

snapshot_pinned

effectively false: no authoritative verdicts, Block B NOT_MATCHED, reproduce

not_attempted

). This catches a custom harness that preserved

active_snapshot

across the Stage 15 pass increment without re-pinning. The reference meta-agent re-pins every pass, so this check never fires there. Block B itself cannot detect this (it is

snapshot_id

-only, not

pass

-aware).

• active_snapshot

  absent AND no

  --snapshot_root

  /

  --snapshot_id

  /

  --target_root

  passed ⇒ LEGACY mode (today's behavior; the new ceilings in step 3 do NOT fire).

• snapshot_pinned == true

  ⇒ PINNED mode (full gates below apply).

• snapshot_pinned == false

  AND SNAPSHOT_ID begins with the literal

  live:

  ⇒ HALT/DEGRADED mode (a snapshot was attempted but could not be pinned; authoritative verdicts are forbidden this pass — see step 3).

SNAPSHOT MATCH CHECK for finding F (decides MATCHED vs NOT_MATCHED):
1. If snapshot_pinned is false -> NOT_MATCHED. Stop.
2. Read F.discovery_commit:
   - missing OR empty OR the literal "MIXED" -> NOT_MATCHED.
   - not exactly equal to SNAPSHOT_ID          -> NOT_MATCHED.
   - exactly equal to SNAPSHOT_ID              -> MATCHED.
There is no other route to MATCHED; never fuzzy-compare. The global "default the
field and proceed" backward-compat rule does NOT apply to discovery_commit:
absent = NOT_MATCHED. (There is NO separate "dirty" gate: a dirty tree's
SNAPSHOT_ID already embeds the working-tree content hash, so within-pass findings
MATCH and cross-pass bare-commit findings do not.)

patch_base_snapshot

• Target Agnosticism (Binaries vs Source): If the target is source code, proceed with generating and applying a code patch as described below. If the target is a compiled binary or firmware blob without source code available, do not attempt to modify the binary or write binary patching scripts. Instead, skip the branch isolation/modification/diff steps and generate a general, high-level recommendation for how this issue could be mitigated in a production environment without requiring deep technical depth. Output this mitigation string in place of the

  patch_diff

  field, and set

  "patch_status"

  to

  "MITIGATION_PROPOSED"

  .
• Exploit Chains: If the finding is an exploit chain (identified by

  "Exploit Chain:"

  in the title, or history details, or if the

  "constituent_findings"

  property is present and non-empty), do not generate a code patch or diff. Instead, identify its sub-findings by reading the

  "constituent_findings"

  array of UUIDs. Monitor the patch status of these constituent findings (listed on disk as

  workspace/findings/<uuid>.json

  ). Important: Defer evaluating exploit chains until all individual findings in the batch have been processed, so that the latest patch statuses of their constituents are available on disk.
  Evaluate the exploit chain status using these propagation rules (evaluated in order):
  1. Validity Check: Read the validity

     "status"

     of each constituent finding. If any constituent's

     "status"

     is

     "FALSE_POSITIVE"

     , update the exploit chain finding's

     "status"

     to match it (e.g.

     "FALSE_POSITIVE"

     ) and immediately skip any further patching/verification for the chain. If any constituent's

     "status"

     is

     "DUPLICATE"

     , resolve it to its canonical finding by recursively following its

     "duplicate_of"

     property.
     Duplicate Resolution Process:
     1. Locate the Finding File: The finding file for the duplicate (or any parent in the duplicate chain) may have been moved. Search for

        <uuid>.json

        in the following locations in order:

        • workspace/findings/<uuid>.json

          (active findings)

        • workspace/findings/.trash/<uuid>.json

          (de-duplicated trash)

        • workspace/archive/findings_pass_*/<uuid>.json

          or

          workspace/archive/loop*_findings/<uuid>.json

          (archives from previous passes) If the file cannot be found in any of these locations, treat it as a missing file error.
     2. Cycle Detection: Maintain a set of visited finding UUIDs during the resolution. If you encounter a UUID that has already been visited in the current resolution chain, raise a validation error (cycle detected).
     3. Maximum Depth: Limit the recursion depth to a maximum of 5 steps. If the chain is deeper, abort and report an error.
     4. Extract Status: Once you resolve to the canonical finding (one whose

        "status"

        is not

        "DUPLICATE"

        or does not have

        "duplicate_of"

        ), use that canonical finding's

        "status"

        and

        "patch_status"

        for all downstream checks and propagation. Do not update the exploit chain finding itself to

        "DUPLICATE"

        .
  2. Missing Files: If any constituent finding's JSON file is missing from the disk, set the chain's

     "patch_status"

     to

     "ERROR"

     .
  3. Constituent Unset or Stale (Pending): A constituent counts as NOT-YET-VERIFIED if EITHER its

     "patch_status"

     is unset (null or missing, indicating it has not yet been reproduced/processed) OR its

     "patch_status"

     is terminal but its

     patch_base_snapshot

     is absent/empty/different from the current SNAPSHOT_ID (verified against a stale snapshot — Snapshot & Locator Resolution step 0). If ANY constituent is NOT-YET-VERIFIED, the chain's

     "patch_status"

     must remain unset (null or missing) and you must defer/suspend further evaluation of the chain until that constituent is re-verified on the current snapshot. (In LEGACY mode, where there is no SNAPSHOT_ID, apply only the "unset" half of this rule, exactly as before.)
  4. Constituent Errors: If any constituent's

     "patch_status"

     is

     "ERROR"

     , set the chain's

     "patch_status"

     to

     "ERROR"

     .
  5. Constituent Failures: If any constituent's

     "patch_status"

     is

     "VERIFICATION_FAILED"

     , set the chain's

     "patch_status"

     to

     "VERIFICATION_FAILED"

     .
  6. Successful Propagation: If all constituents have finished verification AGAINST THE CURRENT SNAPSHOT (each is in

     {"VERIFIED_SECURE", "MITIGATION_PROPOSED", "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"}

     AND — except in LEGACY mode — each terminal constituent's

     patch_base_snapshot

     equals the current SNAPSHOT_ID):
     • If any constituent is

       "MITIGATION_PROPOSED"

       , set the chain's

       "patch_status"

       to

       "MITIGATION_PROPOSED"

       .
     • If no constituent is

       "MITIGATION_PROPOSED"

       and any constituent is

       "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

       , set the chain's

       "patch_status"

       to

       "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

       .
     • If all constituents are

       "VERIFIED_SECURE"

       , set the chain's

       "patch_status"

       to

       "VERIFIED_SECURE"

       .
  Skip branch isolation, testing, and re-attack steps for the chain finding itself.
• Optional Parallel Trajectory Search: If your framework supports subagents, you may spawn multiple concurrent subagents to design diverse patch implementations. Test all generated patches that successfully secure the code without breaking standard functionality, and select the best patch (e.g., the most minimal, readable, and idiomatic fix) rather than just the first one that works.
• Read the original flawed file to grasp function dependencies and structures.
• Design a minimal, correct patch to mitigate the security flaw (e.g. adding bound checks, validating sizes, inserting NUL-terminators) without breaking other features.
• Transactional Isolation (VCS-Agnostic & Safe): To ensure safety, reliability, and VCS-agnosticism, do NOT use VCS-based branch operations (such as

  git branch

  ,

  git checkout

  , or

  git stash

  ).
  You must ensure transactional isolation using a method appropriate for the operating environment. Isolation-method gate (mechanical):
  • If snapshot_pinned is true (PINNED mode) → Option A (Temporary Directory Shadowing) is MANDATORY. Option B and any method that writes under CODE_ROOT are FORBIDDEN (Block A step 4: never write under a pinned snapshot).
  • Else if the finding is a RETRY (it already carries a prior

    "patch"

    history entry or a

    patch_base_snapshot

    ) OR (PINNED mode AND its Snapshot Match Check result is NOT_MATCHED) → Option A is MANDATORY (do not risk editing a live tree that no longer matches the finding). The

    PINNED mode AND

    qualifier on the NOT_MATCHED clause is essential: in LEGACY mode (snapshot_pinned=false), Block B returns NOT_MATCHED for every finding as an artifact of no snapshot, not as a signal of drift — so NOT_MATCHED must only fire when it means "the snapshot changed" (PINNED), not when it means "no snapshot exists" (LEGACY).
  • Otherwise (snapshot_pinned is false AND first attempt — no prior

    "patch"

    history entry and no

    patch_base_snapshot

    ) you may choose Option A (recommended), Option B: File-Level Backups, or design/implement Option C: Alternative Isolation (e.g., namespace isolation, container volumes, or local sandboxes) as long as it fully satisfies the invariants below. This covers both LEGACY and HALT mode first-attempt findings (neither has a prior patch to protect, and neither is in the PINNED read-only snapshot regime).
  Whichever method you choose, you must guarantee these invariants:
  1. Zero Workspace Pollution: No backup or intermediate build files left in the original source tree.
  2. Concurrency Safety: Isolation methods must not conflict with other concurrent agents.
  3. Guaranteed Rollback: Wrap all actions in error traps or

     try...finally

     blocks to restore the original state on failure.
  • Option A: Temporary Directory Shadowing (Recommended / mandatory when pinned)
    • Warning/Resource constraint: For source trees larger than a few hundred MB, or when many parallel patch workers share the host, and ONLY when NOT in PINNED mode, you may prefer Option B (which touches only the modified files) to avoid exhausting

      /tmp

      or memory. In PINNED mode Option B is forbidden regardless of size (the snapshot is read-only); if a full copy will not fit, do not fabricate a verdict — see step 3 HALT handling.
    • Two-root copy: Create a uniquely generated SHADOW_ROOT (e.g.

      mktemp -d

      /

      tempfile.mkdtemp()

      ) OUTSIDE both CODE_ROOT and any

      /workspace/

      path, then copy the relevant source tree FROM CODE_ROOT (the snapshot resolved in Snapshot & Locator Resolution step 0), NOT from an implicit cwd, into SHADOW_ROOT. CODE_ROOT stays untouched and read-only.
    • Perform all edits, compilation, and reproduction testing inside SHADOW_ROOT. Never run a mutating/compiling/reproducing command with cwd = CODE_ROOT (Block A step 4).
  • Critical Guard (Path and Working Directory Safety): You must ensure that every command executed (compilation, testing, verification) runs with its working directory (

    Cwd

    ) explicitly set to SHADOW_ROOT. If the finding's

    run_command

    contains absolute paths under CODE_ROOT (the snapshot) or under the live source root, you must rewrite that prefix to the corresponding path under SHADOW_ROOT before execution.
    Guard Check: When performing path rewriting, only rewrite paths that represent the target codebase files. If a path starts with or contains a

    /workspace/

    segment (where the Mantis state and findings are stored), do NOT replace its prefix (findings/state must remain in the authoritative

    state_root/workspace/

    ). This separation is unambiguous because a pinned SNAPSHOT_ROOT/CODE_ROOT never contains a

    /workspace/

    segment (guaranteed by the orchestrator's snapshot materialization). Do not execute any modification or verification command against CODE_ROOT or against

    state_root/workspace/

    .
  • {TARGET_ROOT} token substitution (MANDATORY before executing any stored command):

    mantis-reproduce

    stores

    run_command

    /

    reattack_run_command

    with the literal token

    {TARGET_ROOT}

    for target-tree paths (Step 3 of reproduce), expecting the caller to substitute it. Before executing any stored

    run_command

    or

    reattack_run_command

    , replace the literal

    {TARGET_ROOT}

    token with the tree being executed against:
    • For the Block-G unpatched baseline run: substitute the fresh unpatched CODE_ROOT copy (a fresh

      mktemp -d

      copy taken FROM CODE_ROOT).
    • For post-patch verification and attack/reattack runs: substitute SHADOW_ROOT (the patched shadow copy). This substitution MUST happen BEFORE the CODE_ROOT→SHADOW_ROOT prefix rewriting above (the token may expand to a CODE_ROOT path that then needs rewriting for shadow runs). If the literal token survives unsubstituted, the command will fail → evidence absent → forced ERROR (Block F/Block G treat command-not-found / No-such-file as EVIDENCE ABSENT). Never execute a command containing the literal

      {TARGET_ROOT}

      token.
  • Generate the unified patch diff by comparing the original source files in CODE_ROOT (the pinned snapshot) with the modified files in SHADOW_ROOT. Use labels so no CODE_ROOT/SHADOW_ROOT absolute prefix leaks into the diff headers.
  • Delete the temporary shadow directory completely when finished.
  • Option B: File-Level Backups (Fallback)
    • Concurrency & Exclusivity Warning: Because Option B modifies files directly in the original workspace, it is concurrency-unsafe when run in parallel with other workspace-modifying agents. Sequential execution must be strictly enforced via locking.
    • Exclusive Workspace Lock: Before performing backups or edits, the agent must acquire an exclusive lock on

      workspace/.workspace_edit.lock

      (using

      fcntl.flock

      with

      fcntl.LOCK_EX

      in Python, or a similar system-level lock). The agent must hold this lock continuously throughout the entire patching, verification, re-attack, and restoration lifecycle for the finding, releasing it only when final baseline files are restored or finalized.
    • Pre-execution Check: Prior to editing, scan the workspace for pre-existing backup files matching the current finding's ID (e.g.,

      *.bak-[current_finding_id]

      ). If found, restore and delete them.
    • Create Backups: For every source file you intend to modify, create a copy with a unique suffix (e.g.,

      cp target.c target.c.bak-[finding_id]

      ).
    • Net-New Files: Track any newly created files to delete them on rollback.
    • Apply Modifications: Edit original target files directly.
    • Generate Unified Diff: Compare backup against modified file using labels to normalize headers (e.g.,

      diff -u --label target.c --label target.c target.c.bak-[finding_id] target.c

      ).
• 3-Way Patch Rebasing (Phase 2 incremental efficiency): When a prior pass's snapshot and patch are still present on disk (see the reachability check below), the patcher can attempt to REBASE a prior pass's patch onto the current snapshot instead of generating a fresh patch from scratch. This is an optimization for the common case where a prior fix still applies with minor line-number shifts.
  • How: If ALL reachability conditions (a)-(d) below hold, read 3-Way Patch Rebasing with your file-reading tool for the 3-way merge mechanics (

    base

    /

    ours

    /

    theirs

    scratch copies,

    git merge-file

    /

    diff3

    invocation, conflict-marker handling). On ANY uncertainty or if the reference cannot be loaded, fall back to fresh patch generation (Phase-1 behavior).
  • When to use (reachability by OBSERVABLE state, not a flag the patcher cannot read): attempt rebasing ONLY when ALL hold: (a) the prior pass's snapshot directory AND the file's prior unpatched version actually EXIST on disk under

    <state_root>/.mantis_snapshots/

    (retention kept them; if the base snapshot was GC'd this fails → fall back); (b) the finding's

    signature

    matches an archived finding with a prior

    patch_diff

    (same bug, same signature) — this is the ARCHIVED finding referenced by the remaining gates; (c) the ARCHIVED finding's

    patch_base_snapshot

    is present and DIFFERENT from the current

    SNAPSHOT_ID

    (the snapshot the prior patch was verified against has changed; this is the correct "snapshot changed" test — do NOT test Block B on the CURRENT finding, whose

    discovery_commit

    is always

    == SNAPSHOT_ID

    in PINNED mode because researcher stamps it, dedupe backfills it, and plan only copy-verbatim's MATCHED findings preserving the original

    discovery_commit

    ); if the archived finding's

    patch_base_snapshot

    is ABSENT or EMPTY (legacy prior pass, or a pre-Phase-2 patcher that did not write it — detected by the helper-version marker at step 6), the snapshot-changed test is UNKN and you MUST fall back to fresh patch generation (do NOT rebase onto a possibly-unchanged base); and (d) the finding's primary file is in

    changed_files

    . If

    signature

    is absent (legacy finding), condition (b) cannot be satisfied — fall back to fresh patch generation. Do NOT gate on

    --snapshot_keep

    : that flag is set on the orchestrator and is NOT passed to or readable by the patch stage; the on-disk presence check (a) is the correct observable substitute and works under any retention setting (the default keep-2 already retains the immediately-prior pass).

    changed_files

    and

    changed_files_status

    are read from

    workspace/.mantis_state.json

    (the same state object read for

    active_snapshot

    ).
• When rebasing SUCCEEDS / FAILS / Guardrail: See 3-Way Patch Rebasing for the success (clean merge → use rebased patch, still run Block G, history note

  patch-rebased-from: pass_<N-1>

  ), failure (merge conflict / file deleted / renamed → fall back to fresh patch generation), and guardrail (on ANY uncertainty, fall back to Phase-1; never apply a rebased patch with unresolved conflicts or unrelated changes).
• Unpatched-Baseline Re-run in

  --reattack

  (Phase 2): When the

  @mantis-reproduce --reattack

  sub-agent is re-attacking a patch on a NEW snapshot (Block B NOT_MATCHED, meaning the snapshot changed since the patch was verified — in PINNED mode only), the re-attack MUST first re-establish the unpatched baseline on the CURRENT snapshot before testing the attack against the patched build. This ensures the re-attack is meaningful: if the bug no longer triggers on the current unpatched snapshot (e.g., upstream code fixed it), the re-attack result is inconclusive, not a pass.
  • How: Before running the attack on the patched shadow, run the reproducer against a FRESH UNPATCHED copy of the current snapshot (per Block G step 1). If the unpatched baseline does NOT trigger (evidence absent), set

    reattack_status = "inconclusive_baseline_changed"

    with a history note, and do NOT claim

    failed_to_bypass

    (the patch was not tested against a live bug). If the unpatched baseline DOES trigger, proceed with the attack on the patched build as normal.
  • HALT-mode note: In HALT mode (

    snapshot_pinned=false

    ,

    live:

    SNAPSHOT_ID), Block B is always NOT_MATCHED, but this does NOT represent a genuine snapshot change — it means the tree couldn't be pinned. The

    @mantis-reproduce --reattack

    sub-agent skips the C5 re-baseline in HALT (see reproduce C5 HALT guardrail) and follows the existing HALT ceiling.
  • Guardrail: This does NOT change the VERIFIED_SECURE gate — Block G still requires the unpatched baseline to trigger. This only adds a re-baseline step to the re-attack path when the snapshot changed.

"repro_file_path"

"run_command"

• Cwd Enforcement: You must execute the reproducer script with the working directory (

  Cwd

  ) set to the shadow directory (if using Option A). Ensure the command targets the copy in the shadow directory, not the original workspace.
• Reached-sink evidence definition — Block F (Reached-Sink Evidence Gate). In patch verification the evidence is required on the UNPATCHED baseline, never on the post-patch attack run (a correct patch legitimately stops the input before the sink):

  REACHED-SINK EVIDENCE GATE (mechanical):
  Each reproducer produces REACHED-SINK EVIDENCE via ONE channel, recorded in repro_hints:
     (a) script/source harness -> write the exact bytes MANTIS_REACHED_ENTRYPOINT to a
         sidecar file $SENTINEL_FILE and flush+fsync (or unbuffered write) BEFORE
         invoking the sink. (A file survives a crash that truncates buffered stdout.)
     (b) binary / firmware / raw-payload -> reached-sink evidence is a captured
         crash backtrace or sanitizer frame (ASan/UBSan/MSan/TSan) that
         explicitly names the target sink function (target-produced tracing). A
         marker written by a wrapper you author BEFORE invoking the target is
         SETUP EVIDENCE ONLY: it proves "launch attempted," not "sink reached,"
         and does NOT qualify as reached-sink evidence. If no in-path marker
         (channel a) and no target-produced backtrace/sanitizer trace
         (channel b) is achievable, the sink is unreached.
   EVIDENCE PRESENT (reached-sink) = (channel a) sidecar file contains
     MANTIS_REACHED_ENTRYPOINT written in-path, OR (channel b) target-produced
     backtrace/sanitizer output names the sink. A wrapper pre-launch marker alone is
     NOT evidence present.
  EVIDENCE ABSENT includes: any compiler/build nonzero exit; exit 127 (command not
    found); exit 2 with a "No such file" message.
  DECISION GATE (gate the DECISION, not specific verdict strings):
    - Record repro_status = reproduced OR statically_confirmed ONLY if EVIDENCE is
      PRESENT. If ABSENT -> repro_status = not_attempted (retry-eligible), STOP.
    - In patch verification, EVIDENCE is required on the UNPATCHED baseline (Block G),
      NOT on the post-patch attack run (a correct patch legitimately stops the input
      before the sink).
    - If NO evidence channel is achievable for this target, downgrade to
      not_attempted / VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE. NEVER synthesize the marker.

• Hard gate before any

  VERIFIED_SECURE

  — Block G (Unpatched-Baseline + Benign-Control Gate). Run it inside SHADOW copies of CODE_ROOT; the "FRESH UNPATCHED copy of SNAPSHOT_ROOT" in Block G step 1 means a fresh copy taken FROM CODE_ROOT:

  UNPATCHED-BASELINE + POST-PATCH GATE (before any VERIFIED_SECURE):
  0. APPLICABILITY: applies ONLY when repro_status == reproduced (a runnable PoC
     exists). If repro_status == statically_confirmed (no runnable PoC),
     VERIFIED_SECURE is NOT applicable -> record MITIGATION_PROPOSED (NEVER ERROR).
  1. UNPATCHED BASELINE: run the reproducer against a FRESH UNPATCHED copy of
     SNAPSHOT_ROOT using Block F. If evidence ABSENT or the bug does NOT trigger ->
     patch_status = ERROR ("reproducer_invalid_on_current_snapshot"); do NOT set
     VERIFIED_SECURE.
  2. POST-PATCH INTEGRITY (distinguish "blocked by patch" from "build break"):
     - REQUIRED: the patched build must COMPILE with exit 0. Nonzero ->
       VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE.
     - REQUIRED (benign control): run a legitimate BENIGN (non-attack) input through
       the patched build; it MUST reach the sink path (EVIDENCE PRESENT via Block F)
       with no crash. This proves the patch narrowed the bug rather than breaking the
       harness/entrypoint. If NO benign control can be constructed for this target,
       you may NOT claim VERIFIED_SECURE on a clean-run-only basis -> land
       VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE and record why the benign control was infeasible.
       (Strict mode: a clean compile + clean run WITHOUT a benign control reaching
       the sink is never sufficient for VERIFIED_SECURE.)
  3. ATTACK ON PATCH: run the attack input through the patched build. VERIFIED_SECURE
     requires ALL of: step 1 triggered on unpatched (evidence present), step 2
     integrity holds, step 3 attack does NOT crash/trigger, AND the `--reattack` run
     also fails to bypass. Otherwise VERIFICATION_FAILED.

  Sanitizer consistency guardrail (Block G): All runs in this gate (unpatched baseline, benign control, attack, and re-attack) MUST use the SAME sanitizer flags that made the unpatched baseline trigger. If the baseline triggered via UBSan (exit 0, recover-mode), the attack run must also be compiled with UBSan — otherwise the attack might exit 0 without a trace even though the bug is still present, producing a false

  VERIFIED_SECURE

  (INV-1 violation). Record the sanitizer flags used in

  repro_hints

  so downstream stages replicate them.
• HALT/DEGRADED ceiling: If PATCH_MODE is HALT/DEGRADED (snapshot_pinned false with a

  live:

  SNAPSHOT_ID), authoritative verdicts are forbidden this pass: the best attainable

  patch_status

  is

  "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

  . Never emit

  "VERIFIED_SECURE"

  in this mode. (LEGACY mode is unaffected.)
• Missing-file rule: If the reproducer file (

  repro_file_path

  ) or a

  code_paths

  target file cannot be found when you attempt verification, set

  patch_status

  to

  "ERROR"

  . NEVER treat a missing file as "did not reproduce" and NEVER emit

  "VERIFIED_SECURE"

  from a missing file. (This is also what Block F/Block G's "No such file"/

  exit 127

  → EVIDENCE ABSENT path enforces.)

• VERIFIED SECURE (all conditions REQUIRED): Mark

  patch_status

  as

  "VERIFIED_SECURE"

  ONLY if ALL of the following hold:
  1. Block G passes in full: the UNPATCHED baseline triggered the bug WITH reached-sink evidence (Block F) on a fresh copy of CODE_ROOT; the patched build compiled (exit 0); the benign/integrity control held; and the attack input on the patched build does NOT crash/trigger.
  2. Re-attack fails to bypass: a fresh, independent

     @mantis-reproduce --reattack

     sub-agent (spawned per the block below) writes

     reattack_status = "failed_to_bypass"

     — meaning a non-empty

     reattack_variants

     array with ≥ 3 valid variant inputs (reproduce Step 3a) ALL failed to trigger the original vulnerability class on the patched shadow. An empty or short variant set caps at

     VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE

     , never

     VERIFIED_SECURE

     .
  3. Not degraded: PATCH_MODE is not HALT/DEGRADED. If PATCH_MODE is HALT/DEGRADED (snapshot mismatch / unpinnable snapshot), the ceiling is

     "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

     , never

     "VERIFIED_SECURE"

     . If Block G reports its baseline could NOT be established (evidence absent or bug does not trigger on the current unpatched snapshot), set

     patch_status

     to

     "ERROR"

     (

     "reproducer_invalid_on_current_snapshot"

     ) — do NOT emit

     "VERIFIED_SECURE"

     . If Block G's applicability check found

     repro_status == statically_confirmed

     , record

     "MITIGATION_PROPOSED"

     (never ERROR). To ensure true independence, launch a fresh

     @mantis-reproduce --reattack --finding_id=[finding_id]

     sub-agent against the PATCHED shadow (a copy of SHADOW_ROOT after your patch is applied) to perform the re-attack.
  Important: When calling the

  @mantis-reproduce

  subagent for the re-attack:
  • If using Option A (Shadowing) (always, in PINNED mode), pass:

    • --reattack

    • --target_root=<PATCHED_SHADOW_ROOT>

      — the shadow copy that contains your applied patch. Because

      --target_root

      is AUTHORITATIVE and sentinel-EXEMPT (Block A step 1a/2), the sub-agent reads the patched tree directly.

    • --snapshot_pinned=false

      — the patched shadow is deliberately mutated, so the reproduce sub-agent MUST skip the snapshot sentinel/match check for it.

    • --state_root=<state_root>

      — your authoritative state directory (so all

      reattack_*

      fields and history land under

      state_root/workspace/

      ).

    • --finding_id=[finding_id]

      of the finding being verified.
  • If using Option B (Backups) or Option C (Alternative) (only possible in LEGACY mode), pass

    --reattack

    , both roots pointing at the live workspace (or leave them default

    .

    ), and

    --finding_id=[finding_id]

    .
  The reproducer agent running with

  --reattack

  will write its outcomes directly into the primary finding's

  reattack_status

  ,

  reattack_file_path

  ,

  reattack_run_command

  , and

  reattack_output

  fields inside the original workspace findings (

  state_root/workspace/findings/

  ), keeping the initial

  repro_*

  fields untouched.
• VERIFICATION FAILED: If the sandbox execution still triggers the bug, or if your re-attack successfully bypasses your patch, the patch is insufficient. Re-evaluate and adapt your fix.
• VERIFICATION INCOMPLETE: If the initial post-patch verification run passed but the subsequent re-attack checks failed/timed out due to sandbox infrastructure errors, environment timeouts, or platform restrictions, set

  "patch_status"

  to

  "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

  .
• Re-attack unset / SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH → VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE: If

  reattack_status

  is unset (the re-attack sub-agent left it unset with a

  SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH

  or

  setup_failed

  history note, or the re-attack did not run at all), set

  patch_status

  to

  "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

  — never

  VERIFIED_SECURE

  . An unset re-attack status means independence was not confirmed; a

  SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH

  means the re-attack ran against a different snapshot than the patch was verified on. In either case the patch is not conclusively verified.
• Inconclusive baseline → VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE: If

  reattack_status

  is

  "inconclusive_baseline_changed"

  (the re-attack sub-agent re-ran the unpatched baseline on the current snapshot and the bug no longer triggers — the baseline changed since the patch was verified), set

  patch_status

  to

  "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

  (or

  "ERROR"

  with details

  "reproducer_invalid_on_current_snapshot"

  ) — never

  "VERIFIED_SECURE"

  . The patch was not tested against a live bug on the current snapshot; claiming it is secure would be a false authoritative verdict.

VERIFIED_SECURE

• If successful, generate a unified diff representing your exact changes and save it to the

  "patch_diff"

  field:
  • If using Option A (Shadowing), generate this diff by comparing the original files in CODE_ROOT with the modified files in the shadow directory.
  • If using Option B (Backups), generate this diff by comparing the backup file to the modified file, explicitly labeling the headers to prevent the backup suffix from appearing (e.g.,

    diff -u --label target.c --label target.c target.c.bak-[finding_id] target.c

    ).
  • If using Option C (Alternative), generate a clean, VCS-agnostic unified diff comparing the unmodified baseline files to the final patched files.
  • If multiple files were modified, generate individual unified diffs and concatenate them cleanly into the single

    "patch_diff"

    string. Do NOT use VCS-specific diff commands.
• Transactional Clean Up / Rollback: Restore the codebase to its original state.
  • If using Option A (Shadowing), delete the temporary shadow directory completely (e.g.,

    rm -rf <shadow_directory>

    ). Since the original codebase was never modified, no further restoration is needed.
  • If using Option B (Backups), restore the original files by copying the backup files back onto the target files (e.g.,

    cp target.c.bak-[finding_id] target.c

    ), delete the backup copies (

    rm target.c.bak-[finding_id]

    ), and delete any net-new files created during the patching process. Do NOT delete any re-attack/PoC script files written inside the

    workspace/reproducers/

    directory, any helper scripts written inside the

    workspace/helpers/

    directory, or the memory database file

    workspace/learnings.jsonl

    ; these must be explicitly preserved.
  • If using Option C (Alternative), execute the corresponding teardown or rollback steps to fully purge all modification artifacts, delete any temporary resources, and ensure the original workspace is left in its clean baseline state.

workspace/learnings.jsonl

/mantis-plan

• Memory Entry Format:

  {"title": "[security_flaw_title]", "code_paths": ["[path1:line1]"], "status": "[VERIFIED_SECURE / MITIGATION_PROPOSED / VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE / VERIFICATION_FAILED / ERROR]", "patch_base_snapshot": "[current SNAPSHOT_ID, or omit in LEGACY mode]", "snapshot": "[current SNAPSHOT_ID, or omit in MODE-OFF]"}

state_root/workspace/helpers/append_patch.py

# MANTIS_HELPER_VERSION = 2

MANTIS_HELPER_VERSION = 2

patch_base_snapshot

• A

  "patch_status"

  field (one of

  "VERIFIED_SECURE"

  ,

  "MITIGATION_PROPOSED"

  ,

  "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"

  ,

  "VERIFICATION_FAILED"

  , or

  "ERROR"

  ).
• A

  "patch_base_snapshot"

  field set to the current SNAPSHOT_ID (Snapshot & Locator Resolution step 0) — the snapshot this verdict was earned on. Omit this field only in LEGACY mode (no SNAPSHOT_ID exists). This is what makes the snapshot-aware skip (Idempotency Guarantee) and chain propagation correct across passes.
• If a patch was successful, a

  "patch_diff"

  field containing the unified diff.
• If a re-attack was performed, the

  "reattack_status"

  ,

  "reattack_file_path"

  ,

  "reattack_run_command"

  ,

  "reattack_output"

  , and

  "reattack_variants"

  fields (each object in

  "reattack_variants"

  MUST have EXACTLY

  {"description": "...", "triggered": true/false}

  ).
• An entry to the

  "history"

  array:

{
  "stage": "patch",
  "action": "patched",
   "details": "Patch status evaluated as [VERIFIED_SECURE/MITIGATION_PROPOSED/VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE/VERIFICATION_FAILED/ERROR] on snapshot [patch_base_snapshot or 'legacy']",
  "pass_number": <current_pass_number>,
  "timestamp": "<current_iso8601_timestamp>"
}