Search operators

Operators turn a search box into a filter over a crawled index. The cost is that you are querying somebody's index, not the web — coverage, freshness and operator fidelity vary enormously between engines. The mistake beginners make is assuming their query ran as typed. Google routinely drops, stems, and synonym-expands your terms, so a zero-result dork and a silently-rewritten dork look nothing alike but are equally useless.

Which engine for which job

You want	Go to	Why
Broad coverage of mainstream web	Google	Largest index, worst operator fidelity
Reliable `site:` enumeration, IP/host pivots	Bing	Honours operators more literally; has `ip:` and `contains:`
Non-Latin script, Russian/CIS/Turkish content, image-adjacent work	Yandex	Different crawl priorities; strongest image matching
Anonymous querying, quick engine-hopping	DuckDuckGo, Startpage	Proxies other indexes; bangs jump between engines
Independent crawl (things the big three never indexed)	Mojeek, Marginalia, Brave	Own crawlers, small but genuinely different
Code, buckets, hosts, archives	Specialised indexes	The general web index never crawled most of it

Never run a dork on one engine only. Different crawlers found different pages, and an engine that never crawled a URL cannot be operator-coaxed into it. Which operator survives where, and where the same operator means something different, is in reference/engine-operators.md.

Operators that still behave

```
"exact phrase"
```
— the single most useful operator. Still subject to rewriting (see below), but the strongest signal you can give.
```
site:
```
— accepts a full host, a registrable domain (matches subdomains), or a TLD (
```
site:gov.uk
```
). Also usable as
```
-site:
```
to exclude.
```
filetype:
```
— Google's documented form. Bing accepts both
```
filetype:
```
and
```
ext:
```
;
```
ext:
```
matches the URL extension rather than the sniffed content type, which is what you usually want for
```
.env
```
,
```
.bak
```
,
```
.sql
```
.
```
intitle:
```
/
```
allintitle:
```
,
```
inurl:
```
/
```
allinurl:
```
,
```
intext:
```
/
```
allintext:
```
. The
```
all*
```
forms apply to every following term but do not mix well with other operators — use them alone.
```
before:
```
/
```
after:
```
with
```
YYYY-MM-DD
```
— filters on Google's estimated document date, which is inferred and often wrong. A coarse sieve, not evidence.
```
-term
```
to exclude,
```
OR
```
(capitalised) or
```
|
```
for alternation, parentheses to group,
```
*
```
as a single-token wildcard inside a phrase.

Operators people still cite that no longer earn their place

cache:

and

info:

were retired,

link:

was withdrawn long ago and any residual behaviour is noise, and

related:

is inconsistent.

inanchor:

and

AROUND(n)

were never documented and behave unpredictably.

for forced inclusion and

for synonym expansion were removed outright, quotes replacing the former, and

daterange:

was superseded by

before:

after:

. A dork library using these returns general results, not an error.

Forcing literal matching

Google's retrieval layer is a semantic matcher with a keyword filter bolted on. It will drop a term it judges unproductive, substitute a synonym, or correct what it thinks is a typo — which is exactly what you do not want when hunting a username or an error string.

Read the result header. Google prints "Missing:
```
<term>
```
" with a "Must include:" link when it dropped something. That link re-runs with the term forced. If you see this, your dork did not run.
Quote every non-obvious token individually, not just the phrase.
Switch to Verbatim mode (Tools, then the "All results" dropdown), which disables stemming, synonyms, spell correction and personalisation. Dorking without it is guesswork.
Expand the duplicate filter. Google collapses "very similar" results and offers a link at the end of the last page to repeat the search including them. On a
```
site:
```
enumeration this commonly doubles the visible set.
If the corrected spelling still wins, the query was read as navigational intent. Add a second rare token to break that.

Finding a target's material outside its own site

Most of what an organisation leaks is hosted by someone else, so sweep the hosts rather than hoping a dork on the target domain catches it: paste and dead-drop hosts, code sandboxes, published-to-web office documents, full-text document repositories, cloud object storage on provider-owned hostnames such as

s3.amazonaws.com

blob.core.windows.net

, and third-party SaaS with public sharing defaults — kanban boards, wikis, form backends, status pages.

site:

the provider, not the customer.

Discovery dorking, defensively framed

Run these against domains you are authorised to assess, or your own estate. Reading a search result is passive — the engine already crawled the page. Fetching the file, downloading the backup, or logging into the panel you found is not, and that is where the legal line sits.

The high-yield shapes, in rough order of hit rate: directory listings left on after a migration (

intitle:"index of"

), config and environment files by extension, database dumps and backup artefacts, credential-shaped strings in indexed text, object storage on provider hostnames, and admin or monitoring interfaces exposed by hostname. The full set, with the person- and document-hunting queries, is in reference/dork-cookbook.md.

Engines only index what something linked to, so unlinked panels and bucket listings are badly under-represented — for live services scan with

find-exposed-servers

. A hit that now 404s is still evidence: take the URL to

read-deleted-pages

Rate limits, CAPTCHAs, and why automation breaks

Detection is not primarily about request rate. Engines fingerprint the client: TLS handshake characteristics, header ordering, whether JavaScript executed, timing behaviour, and the reputation of the source IP. A datacentre IP that has never rendered JavaScript trips the check on its first request, while a residential IP driving a real browser at human pace can dork all day. That is why slowing your loop down often fails when hand-typing the same query works.

The nastiest failure is not the CAPTCHA but a degraded result set that looks normal: operators silently ignored, results truncated, no indication. Never assume a scripted query returned what the browser would.

Sanctioned routes, in preference order. Official search APIs where an engine sells one: within terms, but expect quotas and no parity with the consumer UI, because the API's index and ranking are frequently a different product. Commercial SERP providers, which run the proxy infrastructure and return structured results — paid, and still scraping under someone's terms. Your own SearXNG instance, which normalises results across engines; never a public one, where you inherit strangers' rate-limit reputation and hand your selectors to its operator. And by hand in a browser, which for the twenty to fifty queries a real investigation needs beats building the automation.

Rotating IPs to evade detection is circumvention of a technical access control — a materially different legal posture from scraping, and out of bounds here. The query itself is also logged and attributable, so route sensitive selectors through a non-logging engine or an isolated environment, per

investigate-without-getting-made

Specialised indexes

Each of these ingests a different corpus and answers a question Google cannot.

Code search. GitHub code search covers public repos; grep.app and searchcode index across hosts. Search internal hostnames, key prefixes and the target's email domain, not its name. See
```
secrets-in-git-history
```
.
Cloud storage indexes. Bucket indexes such as Grayhat Warfare enumerate far more open object storage than engines reach, because listing pages are rarely linked from anywhere crawlable.
Document repositories. Scribd, Issuu, SlideShare, DocumentCloud and the academic aggregators full-text index uploads, surfacing a company name buried in a PDF that appears nowhere on its own domain.
Raw-HTML indexes. Publicwww and similar search page source, letting you pivot on analytics IDs and tag-manager containers. A shared tracker ID beats a shared IP as co-ownership evidence: one account configured both.
Archive indexes. The Wayback CDX API and Common Crawl index are queryable URL corpora rather than ranked search, enumerating paths a crawler observed including long-removed ones (
```
read-deleted-pages
```
). Scanners index hosts, not pages (
```
find-exposed-servers
```
); leak corpora,
```
find-leaks-in-the-wild
```
.

Where this goes wrong

The query you typed is not the query that ran. Stemming, synonyms, spell correction and term dropping are the default; without Verbatim a null result is meaningless.
Zero results means one index said no — a statement about that engine's crawl and operator support, not about the web. Absence needs three engines and an archive before you write it down.
site:
never enumerates completely. Google truncates and deduplicates hard, Bing goes deeper, neither is exhaustive. Result counts are estimates you may never quote — page to the end if you need a real one.
The index is a stale mirror. A hit describes the page at crawl time; the live page may differ or be gone, and the snippet may be the only surviving copy. Verify against the live URL and archive it immediately.
before:
/
after:
filters an inferred date. CMS-driven sites restamp pages on render. Never use it to establish when something was published.
Personalisation and geography change results. Two investigators running an identical dork get different pages, so record engine, query and date.
Copied dork libraries rot silently. A retired operator becomes a search term rather than an error, so the query returns plausible general results and you never notice the filter stopped applying.
Cloaking and index poisoning. Crawlers can be served different content than users, and SEO spam seeds a target's name into unrelated pages. A mention is not a relationship.

Confidence grading

Confirmed — you retrieved the live document or its archived capture, read it, and its content states the fact directly, with its metadata or host corroborating origin.
Probable — a distinctive exact-match string on an authoritative host, or the same fact from two independent crawls. A snippet you could not open is at best probable.
Unconfirmed — a snippet only; a hit on a site that republishes others' content; a common-word match; anything from a query not run in Verbatim.
Rejected — a match that survives only without Verbatim, or a mention on a page whose content is machine-generated name-scraping.

Cite URL, engine, query string and retrieval date. A result nobody can re-run is not evidence.

Worked example

Objective: identify who handles procurement at Example Corp, for a supplier due-diligence file. The website lists no names below board level.

site:example.com filetype:pdf procurement

in Verbatim returns four documents. One is a supplier onboarding pack whose PDF properties carry an author string,

m.okafor

, and a template path under a departmental network share — two new selectors out of a document that names nobody in its body.

The dead end:

"m.okafor" site:linkedin.com/in

returns nothing, and neither does the bare handle. No profile, or not in the index.

Rewriting to the email shape works.

"m.okafor@example.com"

hits a public mailing-list archive on an unrelated domain, where the same person signed a technical question with a full name and job title. A Bing

ext:xlsx

sweep of the target host then surfaces a supplier register corroborating the role.

Grade: role confirmed, on two documents both retrieved and read. Identity probable — the handle-to-name mapping rests on one self-signed post.

Pivots

New selector	Goes to
Document files found by `filetype:`	`secrets-in-file-metadata`
Hostnames and subdomains in indexed URLs	`find-hidden-subdomains` , `who-owns-this-domain`
Live services and buckets behind a hit	`find-exposed-servers`
Repositories, gists, key prefixes	`secrets-in-git-history`
Handles and usernames in indexed text	`hunt-a-handle`
Email addresses harvested from documents	`what-an-email-reveals`
Names and roles from staff pages	`find-anyone` , `x-ray-a-company`
Paste-host hits and leaked selectors	`find-leaks-in-the-wild`
Any result that now 404s	`read-deleted-pages`
The resulting cluster of hosts and identities	`graph-the-network`

Legal and ToS notes

Automated querying breaches the terms of every major engine. That is a contract matter and the usual consequence is a block — but defeating those blocks by rotating IPs or solving CAPTCHAs programmatically is circumvention of a technical access control, a more serious question in several jurisdictions.

Finding an exposed file confers no authorization to retrieve it. The result is public; the file behind it may still be a protected computer under computer-misuse law, and "it was in Google" has failed as a defence. Inside an authorized assessment, document it, do not exfiltrate it, report through the agreed channel. Outside one, notify the operator or a national CERT and stop.

Indexed personal data is still personal data — search does not launder it. De-indexing requests also make material deliberately absent from European result sets while present elsewhere, so compare regions before concluding anything is gone. Minimise per ../../ETHICS.md.

google-like-a-spy

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