cloud-k8s

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🇺🇸

Original

English

🇨🇳

Translation

Chinese

Cloud / Container / Kubernetes Security

ACTION REQUIRED（读完后立刻执行）

ACTION REQUIRED (Execute immediately after reading)

```
NOW
```
: 读取
```
../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md
```
— 云/K8s 测试必须书面授权
```
NOW
```
: case-init + scope；明确账号边界、禁止破坏性操作
```
NOW
```
: 确认是云元数据/容器/K8s/IAM，而非普通 Web 扫（后者
```
pentest-tools/
```
）
```
NEXT
```
: tool-index；kubectl/aws/gcloud 等多为手动安装
```
ACT
```
: 从「身份与暴露面」开始，禁止默认全网扫描

```
NOW
```
: Read
```
../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md
```
— Written authorization is mandatory for cloud/K8s testing
```
NOW
```
: case-init + scope; Clarify account boundaries and prohibit destructive operations
```
NOW
```
: Confirm whether it involves cloud metadata/container/K8s/IAM, rather than regular web scanning (use
```
pentest-tools/
```
for the latter)
```
NEXT
```
: tool-index; kubectl/aws/gcloud etc. are mostly installed manually
```
ACT
```
: Start with "Identity and Exposure Surface", prohibit default full-network scanning

适用场景

Applicable Scenarios

云元数据 SSRF（169.254.169.254 / IMDS）
IAM 过度权限、公开存储桶、错误安全组
Docker/containerd 逃逸路径评估
Kubernetes RBAC、Secrets、Admission、供应链镜像
容器镜像漏洞（可联动
```
supply-chain-security/
```
）

Cloud metadata SSRF (169.254.169.254 / IMDS)
IAM over-permissions, public storage buckets, incorrect security groups
Docker/containerd escape path assessment
Kubernetes RBAC, Secrets, Admission, supply chain images
Container image vulnerabilities (can link with
```
supply-chain-security/
```
)

工作流

Workflow

Phase 1 — 身份与边界

Phase 1 — Identity and Boundary

text

□ 当前身份：云 AK/SK、K8s SA、节点 SSH？
□ 范围：单账号 / 单 cluster / 单 namespace
□ 网络档：authorized_target_only

text

□ Current identity: Cloud AK/SK, K8s SA, node SSH?
□ Scope: Single account / Single cluster / Single namespace
□ Network policy: authorized_target_only

Phase 2 — 云控制面

Phase 2 — Cloud Control Plane

bash

undefined

bash

undefined

示例（按厂商替换；MUST 在授权账号内）

Example (replace by vendor; MUST operate within authorized accounts)

aws sts get-caller-identity aws s3 ls

Azure / GCP 对应 identity 命令

Corresponding identity commands for Azure / GCP


```text
□ 公开桶 / 错误 ACL
□ 元数据：IMDSv1 vs v2；SSRF 链
□ 角色可扮演（PassRole）与横向


```text
□ Public buckets / Incorrect ACLs
□ Metadata: IMDSv1 vs v2; SSRF chains
□ Roles that can be assumed (PassRole) and lateral movement

Phase 3 — 容器

Phase 3 — Containers

text

□ 是否 privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork
□ capabilities（SYS_ADMIN 等）
□ 可写宿主机路径 → 逃逸候选
□ 镜像历史与已知 CVE → Trivy

text

□ Whether privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork is enabled
□ Capabilities (such as SYS_ADMIN)
□ Writable host paths → Escape candidates
□ Image history and known CVEs → Trivy

Phase 4 — Kubernetes

bash

kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl get pods,secrets,svc -A
kubectl get clusterrolebindings

text

□ SA token 挂载与权限
□ 危险 admission webhook 缺失
□ etcd / dashboard 暴露
□ 网络策略是否默认放行

bash

kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl get pods,secrets,svc -A
kubectl get clusterrolebindings

text

□ SA token mounting and permissions
□ Missing dangerous admission webhooks
□ etcd / dashboard exposure
□ Whether network policies allow traffic by default

工具链

Toolchain

工具	用途	自举
kubectl	集群交互	手动
trivy	镜像/IaC	bootstrap `trivy` 若可用
kube-bench / kubeaudit	CIS/配置	手动
pacu / scoutsuite	云审计（授权）	手动
nuclei	已知云漏洞模板	bootstrap nmap/nuclei 生态

Tool	Purpose	Bootstrap
kubectl	Cluster interaction	Manual
trivy	Image/IaC scanning	Bootstrap `trivy` if available
kube-bench / kubeaudit	CIS/configuration checks	Manual
pacu / scoutsuite	Cloud audit (authorized)	Manual
nuclei	Known cloud vulnerability templates	Bootstrap nmap/nuclei ecosystem

参考

References

```
references/k8s-cloud-checklist.md
```

CTF 对照：

../../CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud/

../supply-chain-security/

../pentest-tools/

```
references/k8s-cloud-checklist.md
```

CTF reference:

../../CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud/

../supply-chain-security/

../pentest-tools/

路由上下文

Routing Context

上游: MASTER R23
下游: 拿到节点 shell →

attack-chain

windows-ad

；镜像漏洞 → supply-chain
MUST NOT: 未授权扫公有云其他租户

Upstream: MASTER R23
Downstream: Obtain node shell →

attack-chain

windows-ad

; Image vulnerabilities → supply-chain
MUST NOT: Unauthorized scanning of other tenants in public clouds

任务完成自检

Task Completion Self-Check

是否限定在授权账号/cluster？
发现是否含复现与影响？
是否避免破坏性操作？
报告 / journal？

Is it limited to authorized accounts/clusters?
Do findings include reproduction steps and impacts?
Have destructive operations been avoided?
Report / journal completed?